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USSR Monthly Review [redacted]

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March 1984

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Contents

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25X1

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Arms Control Issues

Perspective: The Soviet Attitude Toward Arms Control

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The Soviets have been openly pessimistic for some time about the prospects for arms control agreements with the United States. In the INF talks, they failed to achieve their military objective of preventing deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Western Europe, leaving them with a new military threat. Politically, they were unable to exploit West European interest in controls on theater nuclear weapons to divide the United States and its NATO Allies. Having walked out of INF, rather than marking time at the negotiating table while they "reevaluated" their "strategic position," they probably now find themselves with little flexibility to undertake diplomatic maneuvers at a time when they face a possible deterioration in their strategic posture (see "The Soviets After INF: Picking Up the Pieces").

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At START, the Soviets advocated using SALT II units of account and definitions as the basis for negotiation. They were confronted with a US approach which—by changing the primary units of account—would limit deliverable nuclear power and threaten long-established plans for the development of their strategic forces (see "The Soviet Approach to START and the Implications for Soviet Strategic Forces").

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Moreover, Moscow probably believes, particularly in view of US programs to press ahead with the new MX and Trident missiles, that the SALT II Treaty and the administration's "no undercut" policy have not constrained US weapon programs significantly, a major Soviet arms control objective. The Soviets, in fact, may suspect that one product of the arms control process and the post-SALT US defense debate has been a deeper commitment by the United States to new defense programs that are potentially threatening to the strategic posture of the USSR.

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The Soviets are also likely to be concerned about recently announced US plans for US strategic defenses and their effect on Soviet strategic defensive systems and the ABM Treaty (see "The Status of Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and Implications for the ABM Treaty").

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The Soviet posture toward current multilateral negotiations is somewhat different. These forums provide the USSR with opportunities to exacerbate frictions within the NATO Alliance by presenting itself as a dedicated participant in the process of arms control and contrasting its own "principled" policy with alleged irresponsible US behavior. In MBFR, Moscow is seeking to induce the West to drop its insistence on a prior agreement on manpower data and to accept newly revised Soviet proposals on verification (see "The MBFR Negotiations"). At the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE), the Soviets have been sharply critical of US arms control positions and may be preparing to present a draft treaty banning chemical weapons on a global basis (see "Other Arms Control Issues")

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Moscow also has continued to call attention to the Soviet position on other subjects such as space weaponry, nuclear testing, and nuclear nonproliferation. Andropov's space weapons proposal of August 1983 was aimed at checking US plans to develop advanced antisatellite and ballistic missile defense systems (see "Soviet Proposals for Arms Control in Space"). The Soviets have periodically reiterated their proposal for a comprehensive test ban, seeing it as an effective counter to the US offer to renegotiate the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. They are also maintaining the dialogue with Washington on nuclear nonproliferation, particularly as unfriendly countries like Pakistan and South Africa move closer to a nuclear capability.

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Moscow may also wish to minimize the disruptive effects of public exchanges and "public diplomacy" in the arms control area. In this context, the Soviets presumably designed their January 1984 note on alleged US noncompliance with arms control agreements to contain and perhaps end the public dialogue in this area (see "The Soviet Diplomatic Note on US Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements").

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Although Moscow apparently has decided not to retreat from its conditions for resumption of major bilateral negotiations with the United States, the Soviets may still have several incentives to return. Without ongoing discussions, they lose a valuable means for hampering US technological advances that might prove threatening to them, influencing US perceptions and strategic goals, and diminishing, if not reversing, the impact of US approaches on the Soviet strategic force posture. Some of their spokesmen, in fact, have suggested that informal "back channel" discussions with the United States on some subjects—prior to or parallel with negotiations in yet-to-be-defined forums—might prove productive.

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The Soviets, however, appear to have a complex and not entirely consistent attitude toward dealing with the current US administration on arms control issues. They seem desirous of preserving the basis for a constructive dialogue in anticipation of the President's reelection. But at the same time, they appear unwilling to undertake any actions that could be interpreted as either yielding to the administration's position on arms control or enhancing its reelection prospects.

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Chernenko's assumption of power as General Secretary does not appear to have changed this Soviet attitude dramatically. In the past, he firmly supported Brezhnev's policy of improved relations with the West, including the United States, and he has suggested a personal interest in toning down rhetoric and in hard bargaining. But more recently, when responsible under Andropov for ideology, he has also accused the United States of attempting to torpedo detente, to spur on the arms race, and to revert to a cold war atmosphere. In any case, while Chernenko may now tailor his public foreign policy references to the demands of a broader constituency, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Defense Minister Ustinov are likely to continue to exert considerable influence on arms control measures. Thus, while Chernenko has hinted that some progress on secondary issues may be possible, recent statements by all three officials have reiterated the Soviet insistence that new initiatives on major bilateral arms control topics must come from the United States.

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In sum, the Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START while expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. The Soviets will continue to probe US positions on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any demonstration of improved relations before the US elections, particularly with regard to their fundamental concerns in START and INF (see "Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984").

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The positions of Eastern and Western countries on various arms control negotiations are summarized in a foldout table at the end of this publication

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The Soviets After INF: Picking Up the Pieces [redacted] 25X1

Moscow's departure from the INF talks represented a major political and military setback for the Soviet Union. We believe, nevertheless, that for the immediate future Moscow will concentrate on offsetting NATO INF deployments while seeking to exacerbate political tensions within NATO to prompt conciliatory policies. [redacted]

Setback

Moscow's political objective in entering the talks was to erode the tenuous NATO consensus in favor of INF deployments. The Soviets sought to achieve this through intensive and constant diplomatic consultations in Western Europe that would create suspicion and mistrust between the NATO Allies. Moreover, through vigorous cultivation of influential elements of Western public opinion, including the use of active measures such as covert support of peace groups, the Soviets also sought to mobilize other channels of political pressure to reverse NATO's deployment decision. Moscow, however, underestimated the resolve of the NATO governments to carry out the deployments and overestimated the influence of the Western anti-INF peace movement. The USSR was unable to exploit public interest and debate on arrangements for controlling the use of theater nuclear weapons, and the West European governments successfully deflected the issue. [redacted]

Moscow also failed to achieve its military objective of preventing deployments of Pershing II cruise missiles in Western Europe. Throughout the INF negotiations, the Soviets repeatedly asserted that both of these systems were first-strike weapons because of their accuracy and short flight time. They also characterized them as "strategic," that is, capable of striking their homeland. They claimed that a balance or symmetry of "medium-range" weapons already existed in Europe and said that the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles would drastically shift the balance of forces between the United States and the Soviet Union. Moscow's calculus included US aircraft in the European theater (described as "forward-based systems"), together with French and British strategic nuclear systems, in the balance against the USSR's inventory of intermediate- and medium-range bombers and missiles. This concept of "symmetry" was central to Moscow's overall position. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] the mobility 25X1 of NATO forces, especially ballistic and cruise missile 25X1 units, enhances the ability of these forces to elude Soviet targeting. Soviet statements appeared to suggest uncertainty about the USSR's ability to target and destroy the systems before or during nuclear operations.[1] [redacted] 25X1

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Missile Submarines. In his 25 November statement in *Pravda*, General Secretary Andropov threatened to deploy "in ocean regions and seas" weapons that would place the United States under the same threat that the USSR would face from the new US INF weapons. Submarine deployments probably represented one of the few near-term responses available to Moscow. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

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[1] See "Soviet Nuclear Targeting of Pershing IIs and Cruise Missiles" in this issue for a more detailed discussion of this subject.

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The SS-12/22 SRBM system had not been previously deployed outside the USSR. We believe its arrival in Eastern Europe is in fact linked to NATO's INF deployments.

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SS-20 Bases. As a longer term response to NATO's INF missiles, the USSR in November 1983 announced the end of its moratorium on SS-20 deployment against NATO.

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SRBM Deployments. In January 1984 the Soviets announced that units with "operational-tactical missiles of enhanced range" had been moved into Czechoslovakia and East Germany as part of the response to US INF deployments. The Soviets probably intend to station at least two SS-12/22 brigades in East Germany and two more in Czechoslovakia.

We do not believe that Moscow

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intends to deploy SS-20s outside the USSR. Most targets in Europe are covered by SS-20s deployed in the USSR, where the missiles are relatively safe from Western tactical weapons. Deployment further afield—Cuba, for example—probably entails too great a risk for the military benefits involved.

Other Systems. The Soviets are progressing rapidly toward deployment of three long-range land-attack cruise missiles. The air-launched version—the AS-X-15—could be operational by mid-1984. The sea-launched version—the SS-NX-21—It may be deployed on new SSNs such as the M-, S-, and modified Y-class units, as well as on additional V-IIIs, in 1984 or 1985. The ground-launched version—the SSC-X-4—could be operational in late 1984 or early 1985.

Strategic Implications

These counterdeployments appear designed at least in part for their political impact on NATO. Moscow probably wanted to show the United States and NATO that it could respond expeditiously to NATO's new deployments. The Soviets also probably want to demonstrate that NATO has not enhanced its security by accepting the Pershing and cruise missiles.

The Soviets, however, appear to believe that NATO's deployments have increased the threat to strategic targets in the USSR. They see the P-II and GLCM as qualitative improvements over other US forward-based systems, because of the combination of range and accuracy associated with each. In the Soviet view, this combination creates a new risk for important strategic targets in the USSR—including nuclear delivery and control means—that are critical to the Soviet ability to wage intercontinental as well as theater nuclear war.

Soviet statements, both private and in the open media, indicate a concern for the short flight time of the Pershing II and an attendant short reaction time. The Soviets fear that this short reaction time would complicate their plans to execute a launch-on-tactical-warning option if Pershing IIs were launched in conjunction with or as a precursor to a US intercontinental attack. The ground-launched cruise missile's flight time, which is much longer, makes it less of a threat to time-urgent targets, but its small radar cross section will make it difficult to locate and track in flight, and its range and accuracy make it just as threatening to key targets associated with nuclear storage and force reconstitution.

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A force of 108 Pershing IIs—the total number now scheduled to be deployed by the end of 1985—would not be able to destroy the USSR's command and control structure, as the Soviets have charged. That command and control structure is highly redundant, hardened, and lies in part beyond the range of the Pershing II. The Soviets presumably fear that initial deployment of 108 Pershing IIs would open the door for later deployments of more missiles, possibly with enhanced range or capabilities. Deployment of significantly more than 108 Pershing IIs with increased range would be a Soviet worst case scenario.

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The Soviet walkout from the INF negotiations, therefore, probably was motivated by a combination of political and military factors; the Soviets perceived that their strategic situation was worsening with US deployments, and they were taken aback by their inability to even slow down the deployment schedule.

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Political Implications

Despite these highly publicized counterdeployments, the Soviets have not permitted relations with those West European countries that accepted the new US missiles to be adversely affected. Judging from their actions, they do not want to risk serious damage to their larger and longer term political relations with Western Europe and seem to be especially concerned with preserving their economic ties, particularly with West Germany.

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Although they failed to forestall the beginning of deployments, the Soviets appear to be devoting considerable efforts to limiting, reversing, or precluding their completion. Moscow has maintained its insistence that INF deployments must cease and systems

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be withdrawn before a productive dialogue between the sides can be resumed. Soviet officials constantly reiterate to their West European counterparts that the arms control impasse and the general deterioration of East-West relations are due to US intransigence and belligerence.

The Soviets probably hope that their frequent consultations with the West Europeans and direct reassurances of the USSR's benign intentions will undermine the NATO consensus for completion of the planned deployment. They almost certainly will seek to nurture some West European inclinations toward recommending a moratorium on further deployments and will also hope that the Belgians and Dutch will decide against endorsing the deployments of the systems on their soil later in 1984. Given the lengthy deployment schedule, the INF issue will permit Moscow to continue its long-range objective of undermining West European solidarity with the United States.

Outlook

Soviet military activities in response to NATO's new INF missiles could continue over a period of years and move beyond the initial "political" counterdeployments already mentioned. For example, Moscow presumably will undertake efforts to improve its technical reconnaissance and data-processing capabilities to meet the new targeting problems associated with NATO's deployments. The Soviets may also deploy more SS-12/22s in Eastern Europe and raise the level of readiness of their forces to forestall a NATO preemptive strike. Submarines with new cruise missiles also may be temporarily deployed off the coasts of the United States.

The Soviets are unlikely to return to the negotiations unless or until they see some prospect of gain by doing so, or—conversely—until it becomes apparent that their absence from the talks is counterproductive. Moscow almost certainly recognizes that if talks are to resume it will have to move away from its demand for removal of US missiles as a precondition. Having failed to stop or even delay deployments by their last effort, however, the Soviets probably will continue to attempt to achieve a moratorium—at least for the next several months. Their ultimate goal probably will be to cap, if not reverse, US deployments. They also are likely to hold out for some promise that British and French systems will be accounted for in some forum.

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The Soviet Approach to START and the Implications for Soviet Strategic Forces

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The five sessions of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) held in 1982 and 1983 demonstrated the fundamental differences between the sides on the basic approach to reductions. Moscow advocated SALT II criteria and an INF accord as the framework for negotiation of a START treaty, while the United States opposed any linkage between the two negotiations and proposed changes to the primary units of account. These changes would have the effect of limiting deliverable nuclear power and forcing a restructuring of the Soviet strategic posture.

The Soviet Approach to START

The Soviet approach to START reflects Moscow's desire to ensure that proposed arms control restrictions are consistent with its current force posture and do not disrupt the momentum of planned force improvement programs. Development, production, and procurement of strategic weapon systems in the Soviet Union is a complex process that requires long lead-times for key decisions. After a strategic missile program is authorized, for example, preflight development normally lasts about seven years. Although final deployment levels usually are not established until the first or second year of flight-testing, the weapon's basic design will have been finalized and preparations for production begun at least four years earlier.

It is therefore not surprising that the Soviets adopted an approach to START that retained the primary units of account, definitions, and other criteria of the SALT II Treaty and rejected US proposals that reflected a radical departure from this frame of reference. Many of the key decisions that are governing the development of Soviet strategic forces during the 1980s were made during the latter stages of the SALT II negotiations. Moscow seems to have been satisfied that its obligations under the SALT II Treaty would not interfere with these plans. The Soviet START position appears intended to protect those key strategic force development programs for the remainder of the decade.

Moscow's approach to START also has been related to the INF talks, specifically to the prevention of Pershing II and cruise missile deployments in Western Europe. During the SALT II negotiations, the Soviets suggested that any reductions in strategic forces beyond the levels specified in the SALT II Treaty would have to take into account the existence of US forward-based systems and third-country strategic systems. After INF deployments began, Soviet START negotiators told the US side that the "changed strategic situation" required a reexamination of their negotiating position and made clear that this reanalysis would require a disruption of the START negotiating schedule. While subsequent developments suggest that Moscow is willing to resume exchanges on some secondary arms control issues, it is still adhering publicly to an inflexible position on INF and has been noncommital on START.

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Moscow's START Proposals . . .

Moscow's basic point of departure for START has remained the unratified SALT II Treaty with only slight modifications.

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Quantitative Limits. In an effort to meet US insistence on "deep reductions" in strategic forces, the Soviets proposed in a draft treaty presented in March 1983 that both sides reduce their ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers in stages to a level of 1,800—some 450 less than allowed in the SALT II Treaty. (Such reductions, according to informal Soviet statements, would be completed by 1990.)

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Within this aggregate, their draft would establish sublimits—also to be reached in stages—of 1,200 for MIRV launchers and bombers, 1,080 for MIRV launchers, and 680 for ICBM MIRV launchers. The Soviets also proposed limits on the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but have not tabled specific numbers.

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Limits on New ICBMs. Moscow would retain the limits on "new types" of ICBMs in much the same form as they appeared in the SALT II Treaty. A "new type" of missile would be defined in terms of a number of parameters and capabilities (that is, its length, largest diameter, number of stages, launch weight, and throw weight). A change in the number of stages in a currently deployed ICBM or a change of more than 5 percent in its other capabilities would constitute the creation of a "new type" of ICBM.

Such limits would permit the modernizing and upgrading of deployed missiles without their being defined as a "new type" of missile. This is probably of critical importance to the Soviets because of their practice of producing evolutionary modifications to deployed systems. We believe, for example, that a liquid-propellant follow-on to the SS-18 is in the preflight stage of development and expect that the Soviets would claim it as a "modernization" of an existing system—and not a "new type" of ballistic missile—within the framework of their START draft.

Limits on Heavy ICBMs. The Soviet draft bans the production of any new type of heavy ICBM and prohibits the conversion of launchers of light ICBMs (or of older types of ICBMs deployed before 1964) into launchers of heavy ICBMs. It thus carries over the SALT limit of 308 heavy ICBM launchers into the START agreement.

The draft does not, however, call for specific reductions or sublimits on heavy ICBMs. In the past, Moscow has spurned US proposals in this area as the equivalent of demands for unilateral concessions at the expense of one of its key systems. The Soviets, moreover, completed a program of conversion of heavy missile launchers at the end of 1980 and now possess 308 operational SS-18 ICBM launchers at active ICBM complexes. They clearly are reluctant to reduce this force—the backbone of their hard-target, counterforce potential. We expect the Soviets to retain most of their heavy ICBM launchers well into the 1990s.

. . . and Soviet Strategic Forces

Our estimate of Soviet plans for the development of strategic forces over the remainder of the decade suggests that these plans would be consistent with Moscow's START arms control limitations. We believe that Soviet force goals include:

- An improved first-strike capability against hardened targets as ICBM systems become more accurate.
- Increased survivability, through deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and additional MIRVed SLBMs.
- An improved bomber force.
- Deployment of long-range land-attack cruise missiles.
- Increased use of solid-propellant ICBMs (which permit increased mobility and reduced vulnerability).

In the ICBM area, the Soviets are flight-testing two solid-propellant missiles that could be deployed near the end of 1985 or in early 1986. One, the SS-X-24, is the Soviet-declared "new type" ICBM—a MIRVed system with 10 RVs that will replace some current silo-based MIRVed ICBMs (starting with the SS-17) and may also be deployed on rail-mobile launchers. The second, the SS-X-25, is a single-RV system that the Soviets claim is a modernized SS-13. It will probably be deployed primarily on mobile launchers and will replace currently deployed silo-based SS-11s and SS-13s. Under Moscow's START proposals, we would expect about 320 SS-X-25s to be deployed.

In the SLBM area, the Soviets are flight-testing a new MIRVed liquid-propellant missile—the SS-NX-23—that could be deployed in 1986 as a replacement for the SS-N-18 on D-III-class SSBNs. Analysis of their START proposal suggests that they expect to retain 17 D-III and six Typhoon nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with MIRVed launchers and 280 single-RV SS-N-8 SLBM launchers on D-I and D-II SSBNs. They would probably retire aging Y-class launchers to meet some of their own reduction requirements.

In addition to the systems already noted, we expect Bear H ALCM carriers and the new Blackjack heavy bomber to replace the majority of the Bison and older

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Proposed START Limits

Soviet proposal	
ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers [a]	1,800
MIRVed missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs	1,200
MIRVed missile launchers	1,080
MIRVed ICBM launchers	680
US proposal	
Total ballistic missiles	850
Heavy and medium ICBMs	210
Heavy ICBMs	110
Heavy bombers (including Backfires) and cruise missile carriers	400
Ballistic missile reentry vehicles on ICBMs	2,500
Ballistic missile reentry vehicles	5,000

[a] Backfire bombers are not included.

Note: The Soviets have also proposed limits on the total number of nuclear warheads and bombs carried on all strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, but have not tabled specific numbers.

Bear heavy bombers by the early 1990s. The resulting force would possess substantially improved penetration and weapon delivery capabilities. The Soviet draft suggests a heavy bomber force, excluding the Backfire, of 120 aircraft.

Moscow's Forces and the US START Position

The Soviets have opposed those elements of the US START proposal that, in their view, would limit their flexibility to determine the composition of their strategic forces. Their spokesmen at START have claimed that the US position would require rapid, expensive, large-scale, and unwarranted restructuring of these forces. They probably believe the major effects on their forces would include the following:

- *Changing the traditional Soviet emphasis on ICBMs by requiring an increase in reliance on SLBMs within the framework of a substantially reduced intercontinental nuclear force.* ICBMs currently account for approximately 60 percent of Soviet ballistic missile launchers, approximately 80 percent of their aggregate throw weight, 75 percent of their ballistic missile RVs, and all of their hard-target-capable RVs. The Soviets have serious concerns about the survivability of their SSBN force and thus are likely to continue to resist a START force posture that requires half of their ballistic missile warheads to be on SSBNs.

- *Substantially cutting the Soviet hard-target weapons capable of attacking Minuteman launchers.*

  - Because only 110 "heavy" SS-18s and 100 "medium" ICBMs (SS-19s or SS-X-24s), as well as a total of 2,500 ICBM RVs, would be permitted under the US approach, the Soviets would have to make some significant choices to modify their land-based strategic forces. Currently they have 308 SS-18s and 360 SS-19s, and these missiles alone have the capability of carrying over 5,200 hard-target warheads. One Soviet START adviser has stated that Moscow would insist on retaining the option to replace its SS-18s with newer versions in the future. We believe that, under an arms control agreement requiring deep reductions, the Soviets would seek to retain the maximum possible number of heavy ICBMs. 25X1

  - The Soviets would have to choose between the SS-19 and the SS-X-24 to remain within the subaggregate for "medium" ICBMs. The current SS-X-24 carries 10 warheads, four more than the SS-19, but its warheads are smaller and are less capable of destroying hard targets. Moreover, if the Soviets chose to deploy the SS-X-24 instead of retaining SS-19s, they could deploy fewer single-RV ICBMs because of the ICBM RV sublimit. On the other hand, the prospect of not deploying the SS-X-24, a key component of their new generation of strategic missiles, is hardly an attractive one for the Soviets. 25X1

- *Limiting the number of deliverable missile warheads to less than the estimated minimal Soviet requirements for targeting.* Our analysis indicates that the Soviets probably believe they would need to deliver at least 4,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads for a successful comprehensive strike on North

America. To achieve this, they probably require an inventory exceeding 5,000 RVs because of targeting requirements beyond North America, maintenance schedules that reduce weapons availability, and the need to compensate for unreliable weapons and potential attrition through hostile action.

- *Reducing significantly the number of modern SSBNs.* The number of SSBNs deployed with MIRVed SLBMs would have to be substantially reduced to stay within RV limits. In one likely scenario, for example, the Soviets would probably have to reduce their currently deployed D-III units from 15 to 12 and would be able to deploy no more than five Typhoons.[1] Moreover, nearly all other Soviet SSBNs and their launchers would have to be dismantled. We believe that the Soviets would try to retain their D-I- and D-II-class SSBNs through the 1990s, a force option that their START proposal would permit.

- *Terminating production of Backfire bombers in the mid-1980s to accommodate US "heavy bomber" restrictions.* By the early 1990s Backfires would have to be dismantled as compensation for newly deployed Blackjacks. Soviet negotiators have criticized the US proposal for a ceiling of 400 heavy bombers, stating that they have no intention of agreeing to the US plan to include the Backfire bomber within this sublimit and have no plans to build other heavy bombers up to that ceiling.

Conclusion

A Soviet strategic force developed within the framework of Moscow's draft START Treaty would provide a significant improvement over present Soviet capabilities. Although missile launchers and bombers would decrease, the number of warheads would increase because RV fractionation would more than offset the reductions. Such a force would also have an improved hard-target capability and would be more survivable as a result of the deployment of mobile ICBM launchers. On the other hand, it is also true that, with no limits on fractionation or deployment levels, the Soviets could make a dramatic increase in the total number of warheads on ballistic missiles—probably to more than double the current level—and deploy larger numbers of their newer systems by the mid-1990s.

For the present, we believe that the Soviets will avoid actions that destroy the strategic arms negotiating process as a bridge to the United States. Nevertheless, it is likely they will vigorously resist a substantial deviation from their established START negotiating position.

We believe, therefore, that Moscow will remain reluctant to seriously discuss proposals that are not more consistent with its views on:

- Units of account—especially the use of missiles rather than launchers.

- Required or preferential reductions or abandonment of their heavy and medium ICBM launchers or, alternatively, the use of throw weight as a constraint—without significant concessions from the United States.

- The relationship between the total number of warheads and cruise missiles (and their delivery systems) available to the United States and the fractionation limits that may be imposed on the USSR.

- The Backfire bomber.

- Third-country (British and French) and US forward-based nuclear systems.

The MBFR Negotiations: Searching for Ways Around the Data Problem

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Moscow's decision to return to the MBFR negotiations after a temporary suspension following initial NATO INF deployments has heightened pressures within NATO for a more flexible Western stance on the longstanding impasse over the number of Warsaw Pact troops subject to MBFR—the so-called data dispute. Some Allies believe that a revised Western approach to the data problem is necessary because of Eastern moves over the past year on verification issues (see inset). These recent moves have drawn the Eastern position on verification closer in principle to that of the West and, in the eyes of many Allies, have gained the tactical and public negotiating initiative for the East.

There is also some sentiment among European members of NATO that, in view of Moscow's continued boycott of START and INF, the West should seek to use MBFR to allay public anxieties about the future of US-Soviet arms control. The Soviet leadership succession could add impetus to these sentiments by provoking calls within NATO for a new MBFR initiative as a gesture to reduce East-West tensions.

The Eastern Position

The East's recent strategy in MBFR has been to induce NATO to forgo its demand for resolution of the data dispute before any reductions by offering potential Eastern acceptance of enhanced verification provisions—including limited on-site inspection. The current Eastern negotiating position thus calls for limited US-Soviet withdrawals "by example," that is, before any treaty is signed, but with agreed verification measures in place during these initial withdrawals. These withdrawals would be followed by a freeze on the forces of all MBFR participants. The Soviets and their allies have argued in Vienna that the experience gained from the initial withdrawals would provide the confidence necessary to proceed with formal treaty signature and further reductions to NATO–Warsaw Pact parity in manpower. In contrast, the West's current proposal calls for data agreement and treaty signature prior to any East-West troop withdrawals.

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Current Proposed Verification and Confidence-Building Measures

Eastern Proposals:

- *Notification of initiation of withdrawals.*
- *Voluntary invitation of observers to reductions of "most substantial contingents" of forces.*
- *Noninterference with NTM.*
- *Notification of completion of reductions and compliance with the common ceiling.*
- *Data exchange following completion of reductions.*
- *Thirty days' prior notification of ground movements exceeding 20,000 troops into the reduction area.*
- *Thirty days' advance notification of exercises exceeding 20,000 troops.*
- *Ban on exercises exceeding 40,000 to 50,000 troops.*
- *Establishment of three or four permanent on-site checkpoints, manned by observers, to monitor the exit or entry of forces into the reductions area following achievement of the common ceiling.*
- *On-site inspection "by request," which may be rejected if a "sufficiently convincing explanation" is given by the challenged side.*
- *Creation of a consultative commission.*

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Western Proposals:

- *Advance notification of out-of-garrison activities by one or more divisions.*
- *Exchange of observers at prenotified out-of-garrison activities.*
- *Thirty days' prior notification of movements into the reductions area by one or more divisions or 25,000 troops within one calendar month.*
- *An annual quota of 18 inspections.*
- *The establishment of checkpoints manned by observers from the other side, through which all forces must transit.*
- *Exchange of data upon signature of an agreement.*
- *Noninterference with NTM.*

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The East's revised negotiating strategy almost certainly reflects awareness of growing frustration within NATO over the troop data issue. West Germany, for instance, has been lobbying for a revised NATO negotiating approach that would defer East-West agreement on troop data until after initial US-Soviet withdrawals. As the price for such withdrawals, however, the East would be required to accept the West's proposed package of verification measures designed to ensure Eastern compliance with reductions and limitations (see inset). Other Allies, notably the United Kingdom and Belgium, are reluctant to fall off NATO's existing stand on data agreement but share a sense of concern that the West needs to begin rethinking its overall strategy on data. In general concept, therefore, most Allies are willing to varying degrees to explore the trade-offs between enhanced verification provisions and potential Western flexibility on data agreement.

Significance of the Data Dispute

NATO currently estimates Warsaw Pact forces in the MBFR area at approximately 1.2 million men. As shown in table 1, these estimates exceed Eastern figures tabled in Vienna by 244,000. More than seven years of discussion on this discrepancy have failed to reconcile the radical differences between Eastern and Western data.

The significance of the data dispute in a negotiating context stems from the fact that whatever level of forces is agreed upon as the basis for reductions will determine de facto the size of each side's reductions to parity. Both sides have endorsed the goal of parity at about 700,000 ground personnel and 900,000 ground and air personnel for each side. The West, consequently, has endorsed prior mutual agreement on data as the basis for its underlying contention that the East should take radically asymmetrical troop reductions in order to reach the agreed common ceilings. The East, on the other hand, has viewed the data discussions not as a means for determining the reasons for the data discrepancy but essentially as a bargaining process aimed at fixing an agreed total for Eastern forces that would result in reductions ratios acceptable to the East.

In the past, Eastern negotiators have hinted that an acceptable level of Eastern asymmetry might be on the order of 50,000 troops. Early in the talks, for example, a senior Soviet representative told his US counterpart that—in light of various advantages attributed to the West—50,000 was the largest amount of asymmetry that the East would be willing to absorb. More recently, however, the East has become adamant in its contention that Western data are artificially inflated in order to embarrass the East politically, and, during the most recent rounds of negotiations, Eastern representatives have simply refused to discuss the data issue.

Table 1
Warsaw Pact Manpower in Central Europe [a]

	Western Figures	Eastern Figures	Discrepancy
Total	**1,223,255**	**979,000**	**244,255**
Ground	979,465	796,700	182,765
Air	243,790	182,300	61,490

[a] Western figures are based on NATO estimates as of 1 January 1983. Eastern figures are based on data last tabled in September 1980.

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The Nature of the Discrepancy

Our current understanding of why the East's figures differ so dramatically from Western estimates is based on analysis of the extensive and detailed record of the data dialogue in Vienna

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the discrepancy in figures for Eastern forces is due to three factors:

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- Genuine differences over whether specific Eastern forces should be counted. For example, the Polish Sea-Landing Division is counted by the West but not by the East, which claims that the unit is subordinate to the Polish Navy. (Naval forces are not subject to MBFR.) Our evidence, however, shows that the division is under Army command.

- Possible Western overestimation of Eastern manpower levels for some categories of forces, such as divisions, which the East has included in its tabled figures.

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- Deliberate, systematic Eastern exclusion of entire categories of forces (mainly rear services and national-level institutions) from figures for Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German manpower.

at least 60,000 of the difference results from the East's deliberate exclusion of certain categories of Polish ground forces personnel, mainly in rear service units.

Information on how Polish rear service personnel were excluded from the East's official data suggests that the East applied this same exclusion principle for the forces of each East European participant and perhaps for Soviet forces as well. Indeed, throughout the early period of the data discussion, Eastern negotiators argued that the East should be compensated by the West for large numbers of Warsaw Pact personnel that performed duties analogous to those performed by civilians in NATO forces. In support of this so-called civilian analogue issue, Eastern negotiators in the 1975-78 period contended that whereas Eastern official data included all combat, combat support, and some service support personnel, there was in fact a fourth category of forces which was predominantly filled by civilians in the NATO force structure but by uniformed military personnel in Pact forces.

The East, however, did an abrupt about-face on its civilian analogue argument when it apparently became clear, as a consequence of persistent Western questioning, that the West did not intend to bargain on the size of the discrepancy but rather to hold the East accountable for an explanation of its official data. The East, in response, resorted to the categorical assertion that Eastern official data tabled in 1976 did indeed include all Warsaw Pact personnel in the MBFR reductions area, exactly as defined and understood by the West. This contradiction now constitutes a basic political obstacle to progress on the MBFR data dispute. In effect, the discrepancy, as defined on the basis of current definitions and counting rules, cannot be reconciled without an Eastern admission that its originally tabled data deliberately excluded large numbers of personnel subject to MBFR criteria and that previous Eastern contentions to the contrary on the negotiating record were false

Alternative Approaches to Data

Western demands for Eastern reductions that are radically asymmetrical relative to those of NATO will almost certainly be rejected by the East on the grounds that such reductions would be highly prejudicial to Soviet military and political security requirements in Eastern Europe. Likewise, the East will continue to reject any Western effort to reopen the data discussion if it is not clear from the outset that the West, in effect, is willing to redefine the categories of Eastern manpower subject to MBFR in a manner that reduces the size of presumed Eastern reductions relative to those of NATO. Politically, however, a Western redefinition approach might prove difficult for Western policymakers to endorse if such a revised approach implied a willingness to concede a de facto Eastern advantage in uniformed military manpower, whether on the basis of the civilian analogue argument or some other scheme to reallocate Eastern manpower with respect to the MBFR data base.

An alternative approach, which has been informally discussed from time to time within NATO circles, would be to focus the discussion of data on the major combat and combat support elements of Eastern ground forces, thus deferring or even excluding rear services support personnel from consideration in MBFR. This would have the logic of focusing manpower reductions and limitations on the most threatening and militarily significant portions of Eastern forces. Additionally, because combat and combat support forces are structurally more coherent and distinct than service support forces, such an approach would focus the verification problem on those Eastern units that are most observable and identifiable by national technical means of intelligence monitoring.

From an Eastern perspective, however, a combat forces approach to data is unlikely to be seen as a viable basis for reconstructing the MBFR data base. Although this approach would allow the East to reenter the data discussion under new counting rules—thus avoiding the question of what was excluded from previous Eastern data—it would not reduce

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Table 2
Combat/Combat Support Data Breakout for NATO and Warsaw Pact Ground Forces

	Combat and Combat Support	Major Headquarters and Service Support	Total
Warsaw Pact total	**726**	**253**	**979**
Soviet	409	78	487
NSWP	317	175	492
NATO total	**580**	**225**	**805**
US	150	65	215
Non-US NATO	430	160	590

to any significant degree the ratio of East-West asymmetry required to reach manpower parity (see table 2). In fact, depending on the forces to be covered and the definition of residual ceilings for combat forces, the degree of Eastern asymmetry required to reach parity with Western combat forces could easily approximate the 3-to-1 ratio for reductions required in the current Western proposal.

An approach that would defer data resolution until after limited US-Soviet withdrawals—as favored in concept by some NATO Allies and by Moscow as well—has the political attraction of allowing a fairly straightforward agreement on troop reductions, unencumbered (at least initially) by the legacy of the data dispute. As noted previously, Eastern negotiators in Vienna have hinted that in order to achieve such an agreement the Warsaw Pact states may be willing to accept a series of verification provisions designed to give the West assurance regarding Eastern compliance obligations.

From an intelligence perspective, the actual size of Soviet forces withdrawn from Central Europe under a limited US-Soviet accord could be monitored with generally high confidence if the time and place of such withdrawals were openly stipulated and if the West's proposed on-site verification measures were in place during the reductions process. However, in the absense of a prior East-West redefinition of overall Eastern forces subject to MBFR, the West would continue to estimate Eastern force totals according to existing understandings of Eastern force structure and manpower levels. This, in turn, would result in a continued substantial divergence between Eastern and Western claims for Warsaw Pact troop strength in the area and, in effect, simply postpone a renewed data dispute until after limited troop withdrawals.

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The intelligence problems associated with these varying hypothetical approaches to data resolution in MBFR highlight the fundamental problem of monitoring manpower as the unit of account for MBFR purposes. Manpower remains essentially invisible to national means of verification, and in the aggregate is far too numerous and diverse to be encompassed by any practical or negotiable on-site inspection scheme. A direct implication of this problem is that any MBFR accord based on manpower will require that Western policymakers accept some measure of uncertainty regarding strict Eastern compliance. The degree of this uncertainty can be narrowed to the extent the West can engage the East in a detailed discussion of those forces subject to MBFR, but the degree of intrusiveness inherent in such a discussion will raise serious objections from the East. In practical terms, therefore, differences between Western and Eastern data might well be narrowed but not eliminated. From the policy perspective, the recurrent dilemma presented in MBFR will continue to be the relative security trade-offs between intelligence uncertainty and the benefits of a more productive East-West conventional arms control dialogue.

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The Status of Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and Implications for the ABM Treaty

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Status of Soviet ABM Defenses

Since signing the ABM Treaty in 1972, the Soviets have continued research and development on conventional ballistic missile defense (BMD) and large phased-array radars and have pursued research in advanced technologies that could have BMD applications. Since 1979 they also have been upgrading the Moscow ABM defenses.

Moscow ABM Activity. The single-layer defense of Galosh long-range interceptors at Moscow is being converted to a two-layer defense using a mix of Galosh and SH-08 short-range, high-acceleration interceptors. When completed, the upgrading will provide the Soviets with a more capable defense against a small US attack or increasingly sophisticated third-country missiles. In a large-scale attack, the 100 ABM interceptors allowed by the Treaty would quickly be exhausted, but they might be effective in defending selected targets in the Moscow area, such as national command and control facilities

the Soviets now have 100 Treaty-accountable ABM launchers—the maximum number allowed by the Treaty. As shown in figure 1, there are 32 operational aboveground Galosh launchers and 68 silos under construction—16 in the E-ring defenses, 40 in the B-ring, and 12 at site C-02. Not counted are a silo-like structure at site C-02 that could be a command and control or electronics support facility and a disassembled launcher at the Kubinka ABM training facility. We believe that the E-ring sites will be loaded with a silo-launched version of the Galosh, while the B-ring sites and the C-02 site will be loaded with SH-08s.

In mid-1982 the Soviets began to modify a former SA-2 site, apparently to convert it to an ABM launchsite. In April and May 1983, construction materials, possibly silo facing blocks, were stacked within the site perimeter and construction was suspended. With the number of launchers in the Moscow deployment area so close to the Treaty limit, any silos built at that site will require dismantling operational aboveground Galosh launchers. We believe that the site could be completed in two to three years after silo construction begins.

Construction continues on the large phased-array ABM radar and the adjacent launchsite (C-02) at Pushkino. The radar appears to be externally complete, but it probably will be at least 1986 before its electronic components are installed, tested, and ready for operation.

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Figure 1
Ballistic Missile Defenses at Moscow



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Large Phased-Array Radars. The Soviets are constructing a nationwide system of five new large phased-array radars (LPARs) that, when complete, will enhance their ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) capabilities and their ability to assess the scope and objectives of a ballistic missile attack. The locations and orientation of the radars, with the exception of one under construction near Krasnoyarsk, are consistent with previous Soviet deployment of BMEW radars. Although we believe these LPARs were designed and intended for BMEW, their precision tracking capability gives them the inherent potential to perform space tracking and limited battle management support. We estimate that all of them will be operational by 1990.

The radar near Krasnoyarsk (also known as the Abalakovo LPAR) is physically similar to LPARs the Soviets have said are to be used for BMEW. If it is for this purpose, however, its location and orientation raise serious questions of compliance with the ABM Treaty, which states that BMEW radars must be located on the periphery and be oriented outward. The Krasnoyarsk LPAR is 740 kilometers from the nearest border and overlooks nearly 4,000 kilometers of Soviet landmass. Despite Soviet claims that it is to be used exclusively for space tracking, the elevation angle, orientation, and location of the radar suggest that its primary role is BMEW. The radar would provide little additional coverage to the Soviet space tracking network.

Directed Energy. Since the mid-1960s, the Soviet military has sponsored research in high-energy lasers for ground-based ballistic missile defense. We believe that these efforts are still in research and that the Soviets probably have not yet made a decision to develop and deploy a laser weapon for terminal BMD. Such a decision would probably await the results of feasibility tests of an experimental laser device against RV targets. If the Soviets were to fund a high-priority program to design, develop, and produce a prototype by 1985, we estimate that the first weapon could become operational by the year 2000.

A laser BMD weapon offers several advantages over conventional ABM systems. Because a laser beam would reach its target almost instantaneously, it could be particularly useful against maneuvering RVs, which interceptor missiles would find difficult to engage. Since it does not use a nuclear device to destroy targets, a laser weapon would not add to the problem of radar blackout. The potential rapid refire capability and large number of shots from a laser BMD system would give it a distinct advantage over conventional ABM systems. A ground-based laser BMD system, however, suffers serious disadvantages. It would, for example, be more susceptible to adverse weather conditions than a conventional ABM system. In fact, under some weather conditions, it probably would not work at all.

There is evidence that the Soviets are seeking to develop space-based laser weapons, which would not be hampered by adverse propagation conditions created by the atmosphere. We believe, however, that the first such weapon will be used in an antisatellite role. The fragility and orbital predictability of satellites make them more vulnerable targets than ICBM and SLBM boosters. Moreover, the requirements for continuous coverage by launch-detection systems and the large numbers of orbiting laser weapons and launchers required to ensure the rapid destruction of missiles make BMD the most difficult and costly of potential space-based laser applications.

ATBMs—A Potential Problem Area. Modern technology has eroded the distinction between defensive systems that could be used only against tactical ballistic missiles and those that could be used also against strategic offensive weapons. While defensive systems designed to defend against strategic offensive missiles are limited by the ABM Treaty, those meant to engage tactical ballistic missiles are not.

Development and deployment of antitactical ballistic missiles (ATBMs), therefore, could provide the Soviets with technological and operational advances directly applicable to their ABM efforts. Moscow, for example, currently is developing a SAM system—the SA-X-12—that probably will have ATBM capabilities. The mobility of ATBMs and their potential deployment outside the USSR might pose other

Treaty-related questions. The Treaty obliges the parties not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and prohibits the deployment or transfer of ABM systems to other states

Outlook

The same considerations that led the Soviets to sign the Treaty are likely, in our view, to cause them to continue to abide by the letter of its provisions—at least for the near term—and to promote its continuation. The Soviets probably entered into negotiations for the ABM Treaty, despite their commitment to strategic defense, because they believed that the problems associated with defense against ballistic missiles were difficult to solve and that their ABM technology was substantially behind that of the United States. In addition, the threat posed by the US ballistic missile forces (which had expanded rapidly after the early 1960s and were being further improved by programs for MIRVs and penetration aids) clearly had outstripped Soviet efforts to counter them. Thus, in the late 1960s the Soviets evidently preferred to avoid unlimited competition in an area where they perceived themselves to be technologically inferior and concluded that it was in their best interests to limit US ABM deployment options, even if they had to limit their own to do so.

By continuing to support the ABM Treaty, the Soviets probably believe they can count on at most a modest US ABM effort and thus will not need to channel resources away from other high-priority defense programs or alter the momentum attained in upgrading the Moscow defenses or in developing the ABM-X-3 system. They want to avoid a defensive arms race that would force them into head-to-head technological competition with the United States. Continued adherence to the ABM Treaty will forestall the risk of greater US technology advances in conventional ABM systems, thereby preserving a rough parity with US ABM systems more than a decade old.

The Soviets can continue to improve the Moscow defenses, perhaps by constructing three additional phased-array radars within 150 kilometers of the city, and still be within Treaty limits. These radars could be oriented to support deployment of additional launchers at Moscow or provide ABM battle management support to a broader deployment area should the Treaty be modified or abrogated.

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Deployment of nonconventional ballistic missile defenses probably will not become a Treaty issue for perhaps another decade. Even so, the Soviets may propose changes that would specifically address advanced weapons concepts in an effort to control or negate planned US programs. In fact, if they fail to engage the United States in space arms control negotiations to achieve these objectives, they could use the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), which was established as a joint forum to address Treaty issues, to oppose the US Strategic Defense Inititative—a proposed research and development program to investigate the feasibility of using lasers for a space-based ABM defense. They could charge that the United States was undercutting Article V of the Treaty, which bars the development, testing, or deployment of space-based ABM systems or components. The Treaty does not prohibit the creation of ABM systems based on "other physical principles," but, if either party wishes to propose specific limitations on such systems, this would require discussion in the SCC and could result in Treaty revision. The Soviets probably would balk at such a proposed revision until they were confident of their own efforts to develop exotic defenses.

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Soviet Proposals for Arms Control in Space

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The Soviets are focusing their public efforts for arms control in space on a new draft multilateral treaty that would ban the use or threat of force in or from space. Their primary objective, however, appears to be a resumption of US-USSR talks on antisatellite (ASAT) systems.

The 1983 Space Arms Control Offensive

The Soviet Union launched a major campaign for space arms control in 1983 following President Reagan's 23 March announcement of US plans for the development of a space-based ballistic missile defense. Moscow made space-related arms control the centerpiece of its disarmament activities at the 1983 UN General Assembly, and the Soviet political leadership and scientific community devoted increasing attention to the issue:

- In an interview with *Der Spiegel* in April, General Secretary Andropov urged the adoption of an agreement prohibiting the use of force in or from space and called for consultations between Soviet and American scientists to explore the consequences of developing ballistic missile defenses.

- Within the Soviet scientific community, Yevgeniy Velikhov, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, played a particularly prominent role, serving as host to a Moscow meeting of world scientists to discuss space-related arms control, addressing the issue in both foreign and domestic media, and attending several other international forums to promote Soviet outer space proposals.

- In August, during a meeting with several US Senators, Andropov proposed a new outer space treaty, which shortly thereafter was introduced before the UN General Assembly. He also displayed concern with a more specific space-related threat by announcing a unilateral Soviet moratorium on the launching of ASAT systems.

The 1983 Draft Treaty. Moscow's new treaty proposal is more comprehensive and ambitious than the limited agreement the Soviets were willing to accept during the 1978-79 US-USSR ASAT talks or the 1981 Soviet initiative to ban the deployment of any weapons in outer space (see foldout, page 25). It appears directed at stopping US plans for a space-based ballistic missile defense and goes beyond earlier proposals by:

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- Prohibiting the use of space-based weapons against objects in the atmosphere and on Earth as well as in space.
- Barring the threat as well as the use of force.
- Banning the testing of ASAT and other space-based weapon systems.
- Eliminating existing ASAT systems.
- Prohibiting the testing and use of manned spacecraft for *all* military uses (presumably including the military-related activities in which the Soviets engage during their manned spaceflights).

The ASAT Moratorium. The public announcement of a moratorium was a move without precedent in Moscow's previous space-related arms control initiatives, although the Soviets did suspend testing of their orbital interceptor on an earlier occasion—during the 1978-79 US-USSR ASAT talks.[1] The present moratorium, according to Andropov's statement, is to remain in force as long as other countries follow Moscow's lead and refrain from "putting into space ASAT weapons of any type." The moratorium does not commit Moscow to dismantle its operational interceptor or interfere with its development of airborne and ground-based laser weapon systems. It does, however, bar the Soviets from launching and space testing their operational or developmental orbital interceptors. In return, the United States—which has no operational ASAT system—is to refrain from testing in space its developmental ASAT; the miniature homing vehicle (MHV).

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[1] The Soviets suspended testing following the first session of the talks when they were told that abstention from testing would increase the possibility of reaching an agreement on ASAT weapons limitations.

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Soviet Priorities and Prospects

The special concern with ASAT weapons evidenced by the moratorium proposal reflects Moscow's recognition that Washington's ASAT plans are closer to fruition than US plans for the development of other space-based weapons that would be covered by the draft Soviet treaty. Indeed, the MHV entered flight-testing on 22 January of this year.

The announced moratorium probably also reflected the Soviets' concern about the limitations of their orbital interceptor ASAT and about the difficulty of developing the technology necessary for new systems. The Soviet Union began testing a nonnuclear orbital interceptor in 1968, and only nine of the 15 tests have been successful. Between 1976 and 1981, there were five tests of a developmental version incorporating a probable passive electro-optical sensor; all were failures.

The Soviets are aware, if only from US press reporting, that the MHV employs technology considerably more advanced than that developed mainly during the 1960s for their own ASAT system. We also believe that a potentially more threatening Soviet space-based weapon, a laser, is still in the research and development phase. Moscow's concern about the US ASAT weapon is probably heightened by its awareness that its overall dependence on space systems is growing as a consequence of the ongoing upgrading of its space capabilities.

USSR's problem with space-based laser weapons does not lie in a lack of ability to develop the necessary technology but rather in the time required to convert such technology into an operational system. We estimate that a megawatt-class prototype—that is, one with a range of several hundred kilometers and a capability to cause physical damage to a satellite—could not be tested until the late 1980s at the earliest and probably not until the early 1990s. Meanwhile, it is in Moscow's interest to delay the development of US ASAT systems.

The Soviets are not likely to be optimistic about achieving this goal in light of the US position that compliance with the conditions of Andropov's moratorium would leave the USSR with an ASAT monopoly. They have, however, continued to use their press, the UN forum, the Conference on Disarmament, and other unofficial channels to criticize US ASAT development and hint at the need for US-Soviet ASAT talks. over the past few months several Soviet officials, stated that the USSR was willing to engage in unofficial ASAT talks.

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It is unclear at this time what future role the Soviets will assign to their ASAT moratorium now that MHV testing has begun. By continuing to adhere to the moratorium, Moscow might hope to depict itself as committed to achieving an ASAT agreement. If the Soviets do resume their own ASAT tests, they are likely to claim it is a response to MHV testing and seek to blame the United States for starting an outer space arms race.

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The Soviets will continue to use their proposed multilateral treaty as a means of pressuring the United States on arms control for outer space, but they apparently would prefer a resumption of US-USSR bilateral ASAT talks as a more promising forum for negotiations. Even without progress toward real negotiations, the Soviet proposals serve to support the propaganda portrayal of the USSR as the main advocate of disarmament and the United States as the principal obstacle.

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Soviet Positions on Arms Control in Outer Space, 1978-83

	Prohibited Weapons	Prohibited Acts	Treatment of the Space Shuttle	Exceptions	Testing, Dismantling, and Development	Verification
US-USSR ASAT Talks 1978-79	Not considered.	Destroying, damaging, or changing the trajectory or orbit of a space object in which the US or USSR had an interest.	Test suspension should apply to the US shuttle.	Insisted on right to take action against non-weapons-related satellites whose mission it considered hostile, such as direct broadcast satellites.	Test suspensions should apply to "any means" of damaging, destroying, or changing the trajectory of a space object. Delayed discussions of dismantling existing systems and banning further development.	Discussed verification by national technical means and agreement not to interfere with such means.
1981 proposal for a multilateral treaty to ban the deployment of any weapons in outer space	Weapons of any kind in orbit, installed on a celestial body or deployed in any other way.	Destroying, damaging, or disturbing the normal functioning or flight trajectory of space vehicles that are not weapons.	Would ban the use of the shuttle for weapon deployment.	Treaty language would allow retention of ASAT weapons for use against deployment of ASAT weapons by other side.	No provision included.	Use of national technical means available and ban on interference with monitoring facilities of other states.
1983 proposal for multilateral treaty banning the use of force in and from space	Any space weapons in orbit deployed on celestial bodies or in any other manner for hitting targets on Earth, in the atmosphere, or in space.	Use and threat of force in, to, and from outer space. Destroying, damaging, or disrupting the normal functioning or flight trajectories of space vehicles.	Would ban testing or use of the shuttle for military, including ASAT, purposes.	None.	Ban on testing of space-based weapons capable of hitting targets on Earth. Ban on development and testing of new ASAT weapons. Elimination of existing ASAT systems.	Use of national technical means available and ban on interference with monitoring facilities of other states.

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Other Arms Control Issues

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The suspension last fall of the principal East-West negotiations on arms control brought increased international attention to discussion in other forums, particularly the Conference on Disarmament in Europe and the UN Conference on Disarmament. General Secretary Chernenko further underscored the potential significance of these forums by implying that, because of the impasse on INF and START, the best prospect for improved US-Soviet relations lay in progress on less prominent issues, including the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, a comprehensive test ban treaty, and negotiations to ban chemical weapons. Except for chemical warfare, however, the Soviets have given no indication of willingness to moderate their positions on any of these issues. In particular, Soviet reluctance to provide what the US would consider adequate information for verifying compliance remains a major stumblingblock to agreement on all of them.

Conference on Disarmament in Europe

Moscow's strategy so far at the CDE, which opened in Stockholm on 17 January and recessed on 16 March, has been to profess deep interest in arms control and to reiterate earlier Eastern proposals, while opposing confidence- and security-building measures that would provide significant additional information on Warsaw Pact military activities. The Soviets also have used the forum to denounce NATO defense policies, particularly the deployment of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

In the weeks following the suspension of major East-West arms negotiations in the fall of 1983, the Soviets appeared uncertain over how to approach the upcoming CDE, and the Finnish press reported on 14 December that Foreign Minister Gromyko had told the Finnish Foreign Minister that he had not yet decided whether to take part in the conference.

The decision that Gromyko would attend the conference and meet with Secretary Shultz presumably reflected Soviet concern not to appear less reluctant than the US and its allies to maintain a dialogue on arms control issues. Nonetheless, the Soviets sought to ensure that they not appear to have softened their position. A TASS commentary of 31 December characterized the US announcement of the upcoming bilateral meeting as a "publicity statement" intended to "instill complacency" in Western Europe and the United States and asserted that neither the CDE nor bilateral contacts could substitute for the suspended talks in Geneva.

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Gromyko underscored this point by delivering a tough speech to the conference on 18 January. He accused the US of exporting "militarism, enmity, and a war psychosis" to Europe, of wrecking the dialogue on limiting nuclear weapons in Europe by deploying its new missiles, and of embarking upon military expansion with "maniacal obsession." He said that the USSR was ready for serious negotiating but would not participate in talks used to cover "militarist plans," and he called statements that the US was ready to talk while INF deployments continued "verbal camouflage."

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Gromyko also outlined Soviet proposals, none of which were new. He called upon other states to follow the Soviet example of unilaterally renouncing first use of nuclear weapons and urged NATO to respond favorably to the Warsaw Pact proposal of January 1983 for a treaty on the mutual nonuse of military force. He said it would be worthwhile to address the problem of reducing military spending, referred to the desirability of ridding Europe of chemical weapons—an allusion to the Soviet proposal of 10 January—and reiterated Soviet support for a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe. He also suggested that further attention be given to reaching agreements on prior notification of major military exercises and movements and of air and naval exercises adjoining Europe.

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Gromyko expressed Soviet determination to resist proposals for confidence- and security-building measures that would result in "unilateral advantages"—that is, require the USSR to reveal military information which the US, as a non-European power, would be exempt from revealing. A subsequent article in *Pravda,* and comments by Soviet officials, also stressed this point. Meanwhile, the persistence with which Soviet representatives argued for Western agreement to a nonuse-of-force treaty prompted the chief of the US delegation to charge them with making this a "precondition" for discussing the issues the CDE was intended to consider.

The Soviets do not appear to be planning any major new initiatives at Stockholm, although they are likely to elaborate upon the proposals outlined by Gromyko by tabling specific confidence- and security-building measures. These probably will include:

- Prohibition of military exercises involving more than 50,000 troops.
- Lowering the threshold for advance notification of exercises from 25,000 to 20,000 troops and extending the leadtime from three weeks to one month.
- Requiring withdrawal of nuclear-armed ships from the Mediterranean Sea and prohibiting nuclear weapons in those Mediterranean countries where they are not already deployed.

The Soviets may also give more prominence to their proposal for a treaty banning chemical weapons from Europe. In general, however, they appear to have little expectation of substantive achievements at the CDE over the near term (the first phase is expected to last until November 1986), and they are likely to continue treating the conference primarily as a propaganda forum, while opposing Western efforts to secure an agreement on greater exchange of data.

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

The past year brought no change in the divergent positions of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974, which limits the yield of nuclear tests to 150 kilotons. The issue of verification remains the chief stumblingblock. The Soviets claim that implementation of the treaty would result in an exchange of information adequate for verifying compliance, while the US insists that better means of verification must be negotiated before the treaty can go into force.

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The compliance issue was raised to a new level of visibility in late January, when the President sent to Congress a report charging the Soviets with noncompliance with several arms control agreements. On the TTBT, the report concluded that a number of Soviet tests were in "likely violation." The Soviets quickly responded by presenting the US with an aide memoire of their own—which they subsequently published—charging a number of US violations of arms control agreements. It stated that the USSR has data indicating "numerous cases" in which the US has exceeded the TTBT's 150-kiloton limit.

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General Secretary Chernenko, in a speech on 2 March, cited ratification of the TTBT as one of a number of actions the US could take on security issues other than INF and START that could initiate a dramatic breakthrough in US-Soviet relations. He gave no indication, however, that the Soviets are prepared to moderate their opposition to enhanced verification procedures, which has been the principal obstacle to ratification.

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

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As with the TTBT, US and Soviet positions on the issue of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTB), which would outlaw all nuclear explosions, remained essentially static through 1983. In 1980, the United States suspended participation in CTB talks with the UK and the USSR as a protest over Soviet action in Afghanistan. In July 1982, the new US administration, seeing an urgent need to modernize US strategic systems, formally withdrew from the talks on the grounds that verification capabilities were insufficient to provide an adequate basis for negotiating a treaty. Since then, the principal venue for nuclear test ban discussions has been the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where the US has sought to keep discussion focused on verification, while the USSR and nonaligned countries have argued for expanding the scope of negotiations. In addition, some members of the Western group have privately urged the US and UK to move in this direction.

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The Soviets have repeatedly called for resumption of the CTB trilaterals, most recently in Chernenko's speech of 2 March. The US has responded that the CD provides an adequate forum for seeking the improved verification capabilities necessary for an effective nuclear test ban. The USSR has charged the US and UK with using this issue as a "smokescreen" to delay progress toward negotiations and is likely to make an intense effort during the current CD session to isolate the US on this issue. Regardless of tactical maneuvering, however, the differences between the US and USSR make it extremely unlikely that there will be meaningful progress at the CD on this issue, and the Soviets have given no indication that they will take any substantive initiative that would facilitate resumption of the trilaterals.

Chemical Warfare

Discussion of chemical warfare (CW) during the past year also centered on the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The US seized the initiative last spring when Vice President Bush called for accelerated negotiations and US delegates submitted a detailed statement on the content of a CW convention. On 17 January, Secretary Shultz announced at the Stockholm conference that the US would table a draft treaty to ban chemical warfare globally within the next few months.

In an apparent attempt to regain the initiative, the Soviets announced on 21 February that they are prepared to accept the principle of continuous international monitoring of destruction sites. Previously, they had indicated that they would be willing to accept international inspection only on a quota system, whereby a certain number of inspections would be permitted each year. The Soviets continue to reject the principle of compulsory inspection by challenge, whereby a party could invoke special on-site inspection procedures whenever it had reason to believe a violation might have occurred. the decision to alter the Soviet position was made late last year and was intended to preempt the expected tabling of a US draft.

The Soviets took a separate initiative in January of this year when they presented NATO representatives in Moscow with a proposal to ban chemical weapons from Europe, an idea originally broached in the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Pact summit of January 1983. The proposal called for a meeting later this year of states interested in such an agreement. In making the proposal, the Soviets stated that it was meant to be separate from but parallel to the negotiations in Geneva. The Soviet move may have been intended in part to play upon divisions between those NATO members who support the idea of a regional ban and the US, which prefers a global agreement.

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General Secretary Chernenko further highlighted the chemical warfare issue in his speech on 2 March, when he said that conditions are "beginning to ripen" for an accord and hinted that the Soviets might be prepared to negotiate further on the issue of verification. Despite his relative optimism, however, it remains to be seen whether there indeed is sufficient flexibility in the Soviet position on verification to allow for significant progress toward an agreement.

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Meanwhile, the US and USSR have exchanged public charges of misconduct in relation to chemical warfare. The President's report to Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements charged that the USSR repeatedly has violated its legal obligations under the Biologic and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972, and customary international law as codified in the 1925 Geneva Protocol, by maintaining an offensive biological warfare program and by involving itself in chemical warfare activities in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The Soviet aide memoire issued in response to the President's report charged the US with obstructing negotiations on chemical weapons and accelerating production of chemical agents, but did not accuse the US of violating specific agreements.

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The Soviet Diplomatic Note on US Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

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On 27 January 1984 the Soviet Union delivered to the US State Department a diplomatic note containing several charges of alleged US noncompliance with arms control agreements. This occurred a few days after the President had sent Congress a report on Soviet noncompliance. Soon afterward, TASS published the text of the Soviet note.

The Soviets in the past have raised questions in the US-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) about US compliance, calling attention to activities that they said were inconsistent with relevant agreements. They have usually eschewed publicity, however, and have periodically rebuked the United States for failing to maintain the confidentiality of SCC proceedings. Thus, although Soviet leaders were probably aware that Washington was considering some publicity on the subject, they probably were disconcerted by the creation of a public dialogue, by the substance of the questions aired, and by the relative explicitness of the subsequent discussion.

The Soviet Approach to Compliance

The general Soviet attitude toward compliance with provisions of accords has several characteristics:

- Moscow observes those agreed provisions that are specific and detailed, are policed by strong US monitoring capabilities, and include arrangements for addressing compliance issues.
- Compliance has been to the letter, rather than the spirit, of such provisions, with the Soviets availing themselves of the flexibility inherent in ambiguous treaty language and asymmetries in information to make their activities appear consistent with their obligations.
- Moscow generally has not abided by US unilateral statements or interpretations.

In several significant compliance areas, Soviet activities have illustrated these attitudes. The Soviets have followed the regimen for compensatory dismantlement of strategic offensive weapons that is required under the SALT I Interim Agreement, for example, and have remained within the numerical limits for system components mandated by the ABM Treaty. When challenged about ambiguous situations arising in these compliance areas, they have either undertaken what they probably believed were corrective actions or provided answers that they may have thought solved the problem.

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In its responses, however, Moscow has never acknowledged wrongdoing; in fact, despite occasional remedial actions, its rhetoric has at times been abrasive. When answering a US query, moreover, the Soviets have carefully set forth precisely the amount of data required, in their view, and no more. On balance, Moscow has probably viewed its own activities related to SALT I as legally defensible.

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Toward the unratified SALT II Treaty, the Soviet public position always has been one of calculated ambiguity. On the one hand, Moscow has stated that the Soviet Union is always true to its word, would not undercut the Treaty, and would not jeopardize ongoing talks. On the other, it has stated that its compliance is voluntary and hinted periodically that its abstinence from actions inconsistent with the unratified Treaty cannot be taken for granted indefinitely.

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In recent months, new developments in Moscow's weapon programs have strained the system by which several strategic arms restrictions have been honored, with the United States questioning Moscow's interpretation of, and compliance with, some provisions of the ABM and SALT II agreements. Nevertheless, during past arms control negotiations, the Soviets bargained with apparent vigor both to preserve weapon programs in progress and to ensure that the language of the provisions being discussed would be consistent with those programs. In this context, the

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Soviets probably believe that they can justify their current actions, including those discussed in the President's report, as basically correct and consistent with their obligations.

Moscow's Charges Against the United States

There is a degree of polemic associated with Moscow's presentation, of course. Nevertheless, the Soviets may feel that they have substantive reasons for the most significant of the charges made in their note of 27 January.[1]

Ratification of SALT II. The Soviets have stated several times in the SCC that, because the SALT II Treaty has not been ratified, it is outside the purview of the compliance framework and beyond the jurisdiction of the SCC. Although they have provided some information on activities limited by SALT II in response to US queries, they have, in general, been slow to answer SALT II questions and have expressed disapproval of any extension of the SCC to deal with SALT II issues.

Deployments of INF Systems to Western Europe as "Circumvention" of SALT II Limits. Throughout most of the SALT negotiations, the question of restrictions on US forward-based systems has been a contentious issue. For the most part, the Soviets insisted that such systems be included—or at least "taken account of"—in any agreement limiting strategic arms. They also stated that any reduction of central systems beyond the levels specified in the SALT II Treaty would have to take into account the existence of these forward-based systems.

The Cruise Missile as an Unresolved Protocol Issue. Soviet military officers and civilian sources have frequently expressed concern over the threat that US cruise missiles could present to the USSR. For roughly a decade, the Soviets have tried to use various strategic arms negotiations to preclude or severely restrict their deployment.

In the period after the SALT II Treaty and Protocol—with its temporary restrictions on these systems—were signed, the Soviets appear to have expected an expeditious resolution of the status of cruise missiles. As it became apparent that the Protocol would expire before its issues were resolved, Soviet military commentators, as well as Soviet diplomats on the SCC, voiced reluctance to consider reducing other strategic weapon systems. 25X1 25X1

the contents of the Protocol related to ground-launched and sea-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs and SLCMs) were an integral part of the Treaty and had been taken into account when the other aggregate limitations were negotiated 25X1 25X1 25X1

After the expiration of the SALT II Protocol at the end of 1981, then General Secretary Brezhnev called for a continued ban on SLCM and GLCM deployment, and at arms control negotiations in 1982 and 1983 the Soviets continued their efforts to restrict these systems severely. At START, they insisted that cruise missiles be considered as part of any reduction scenario, and at INF they stressed the urgency of banning GLCM deployments altogether. With the beginning of INF GLCM deployments in 1983, they stated at both forums that their arms control proposals would have to be revised to take account of the "changed strategic situation." The Soviets, therefore, have objected to the US handling of the cruise missile issue throughout the strategic arms negotiation process. 25X1 25X1

Minuteman III Missiles in Minuteman II Silos—the "Shelters" Issue. Between 1972 and 1979, the United States undertook to improve the survivability of the Minuteman ICBM force by hardening Minuteman launch silos. At some of them, shelters of about 2,100 and 2,700 square feet were used to protect the work from the weather. These were larger than the environmental shelters used during initial silo construction (about 700 square feet) and at other silos being upgraded (about 300 square feet). The Soviets raised this question in diplomatic channels in 1973 and at the SCC in 1975, claiming that the shelters impeded their verification by national technical means (NTM) of US activities at these launcher sites. In 1981 they raised a similar question regarding the use of a shelter over a Titan ICBM launcher in Kansas. 25X1 25X1

Despite the problems with Minuteman shelters, members of the Soviet SALT II delegation in the mid-1970s affirmed repeatedly to their US counterparts

[1] Soviet charges related to TTBT and chemical weapons are discussed in the preceding article 25X1

that the USSR could distinguish between launchers of the un-MIRVed Minuteman II and of the MIRVed Minuteman III. One Soviet delegate told a US colleague in 1976, for example, that Soviet NTM had provided proof that certain US launchers had been constructed or converted for Minuteman II and others for Minuteman III ICBMs.

In 1978, however, the sides agreed to MIRV launcher counting rules that would require Moscow to place some launchers containing non-MIRVed missiles in the MIRV launcher aggregate—and at this point the Soviets reversed themselves on their ability to distinguish between Minuteman launchers. They stated that, unless the United States presented convincing evidence to the contrary, all Minuteman II launchers should be subject to both the MIRV aggregate and the subceiling on MIRVed ICBM launchers; they added that the problem of distinguishability was aggravated by the large shelters over US ICBM silos undergoing modification.

In June 1979, when the SALT Treaty was signed, the United States confirmed that all shelters had been removed from the launcher sites and promised that no shelters that impeded verification by NTM would be used over ICBM silo launchers. The Soviets in turn acknowledged US statements that Minuteman III ICBMs could not be launched from Minuteman II launchers and agreed that the United States had 550 launchers of ICBMs equipped with MIRVs.

At the fall 1980 session of the SCC, the Soviets again raised this distinguishability issue. They observed that reports in US media of US interest in deploying 50 to 100 Minuteman III missiles in Minuteman II launchers were inconsistent with earlier US official assurances that Minuteman II launchers could not launch Minuteman III ICBMs. The US side responded that Minuteman II launchers would have to be converted before being capable of launching Minuteman III missiles and that such activities could be detected by Soviet NTM. This answer was deemed "useful" by the Soviet side—a response that did not preclude reopening the topic. Soviet representatives, in fact, alluded to the "unsatisfactory" record of the US side on this subject in 1981, when discussing the Titan shelter mentioned above. If all 1,000 Minuteman launchers had to be counted as MIRVed, the United States would be at variance with the 820 figure for the MIRVed ICBM launcher subaggregate in the SALT II Treaty. 25X1

Shemya Island and Pave Paws Facilities as ABM Radars. Throughout the negotiations leading to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the United States repeatedly emphasized that large phased-array radars (LPARs) had the inherent capability to detect and track a number of small objects, such as ballistic missile reentry vehicles, at great distances. This position grew, in large part, from a serious concern that the Soviet phased-array radars then in use for early warning (the Hen House system) could contribute to an upgrading of widely deployed Soviet air defenses so as to give them an ABM capability. The United States, therefore, consistently sought to have the proposed agreement incorporate limits on all large phased-array radars. 25X1

The Soviets believed that the ABM Treaty should place limits only on radars specifically designed for ABM purposes. It should not limit other large phased-array radars (such as those used as NTM or for space tracking), they maintained. 25X1

In the final Treaty, the restrictions on the capabilities and deployment of ABM and early warning radars reflected the attempt to reconcile (1) an acknowledgment that there were legitimate, non-ABM uses of large phased-array radars with (2) a realization that these facilities had some inherent capabilities to perform in an ABM role. In a Treaty-related unilateral statement focused on Hen House radars, however, the United States reiterated its concern about improvements to non-ABM facilities that could erode the effectiveness of ABM Treaty provisions. 25X1

After ratification, the Soviets were the first to raise the issue of radar construction that might be inconsistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty. In 1975, at the spring session of the SCC, they called attention to the construction of a large phased-array radar (known as Cobra Dane) on Shemya Island, Alaska (a site outside any US ABM test range and not located at

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any of the permitted deployment areas), claiming that it incorporated components tested and developed for ABM purposes. They said that the situation was "ambiguous" within the framework of the ABM Treaty and asked the United States to clarify the facility's status. The United States responded that it was not an ABM radar, that Soviet NTM could confirm its intended mission, and that its deployment was consistent with the Treaty. The Soviets acknowledged the US answer but reserved the right to return to the subject.

At the fall 1978 SCC session, the Soviets expressed concern on a similar topic, citing the construction of new radar facilities (known as Pave Paws) at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts and Beale Air Force Base in California. They noted that the technical capabilities appeared to correspond to those of ABM radars and that the Pave Paws—combined with other radars in the United States—could create the radar base for a territorial ABM system, a development that would be inconsistent with the Treaty. The United States responded in the spring of 1979 that the radars were replacing obsolete early warning facilities, and it provided technical data to confirm their early warning mission. The Soviets again acknowledged the US response but did not close the issue.

In the early 1980s, partially as a response to US questions about Soviet construction of several new LPARs that might be inconsistent with the ABM Treaty, Moscow's SCC representatives renewed their expressions of concern about Pave Paws, calling attention to US plans for modernization and new construction. The representatives also stated that the technical data provided earlier by the US side did not answer the questions Moscow had raised. This subject was still unresolved in 1984, when the President's report and the Soviet note were publicized.

Implications

The Soviets clearly were well prepared to respond expeditiously to the President's compliance report. The subjects in question had been discussed between the sides for some time in diplomatic channels and at the SCC, and the Soviets had previously set forth well-defined positions, counterarguments, and countercharges in each significant area. The publicity they gave to this diplomatic note was unusual; in the past they have been reluctant to discuss these issues except in confidential channels. Their action was especially striking because one of the Soviet complaints has been that the United States continually violated the requirement to maintain the confidentiality of discussions in this area.

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Moscow probably took a quick and firm position on this subject to demonstrate Soviet determination to resist US public pressures in the arms control area. The note suggested to significant elements of US and world public opinion that there is a corresponding Soviet "case" against the United States and that the President's report represented only selected facets of more comprehensive problems. The action was probably also intended to demonstrate to the United States that Moscow views its own behavior as legally defensible.

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The Soviets' note was less harsh in tone than their statements immediately after the suspension of the several arms control negotiations in late 1983. Moscow therefore has signaled that it will not be the first to completely abandon compliance-related efforts. But by calling attention to the corrosive effect that this exchange has had on attitudes toward obligations, commitments, and "trust" between the sides, Moscow appears to be warning that progress in the area of arms control will be difficult amidst charges of noncompliance with Treaty obligations.

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By refraining from a detailed public rebuttal of the US charges, the Soviets have also probably signaled that they wish to contain discussion and remove the subject from the public arena. In any event, they probably also believe that their diplomatic note was a necessary response to the President's report and that the demarche has diluted, if not neutralized, the effect of the President's report on significant elements of US and world public opinion.

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Soviet Interest in Arms Control Negotiations in 1984

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The Soviets appear to have adopted a two-pronged strategy on arms control, taking an inflexible line on INF and START while simultaneously expressing willingness to move ahead on other security issues and signaling that a breakthrough in US-Soviet relations is possible if Washington shows flexibility in these other areas. They presumably calculate that this strategy enables them to stand firm on the central issues of INF and START without appearing so intransigent as to rally support for NATO's policies or to demonstrate that they, not the US administration, are responsible for poor US-Soviet relations. Meanwhile, they continue to probe for US flexibility on a range of issues, with the aim of extracting the maximum price for any marked improvement in relations or arms control issues before the US elections. The Politburo will be wary of any major steps unless convinced that significant gains are at hand for the USSR, especially on their fundamental concerns in START and INF.

The Soviet Calculus

Two major considerations appear to be behind current Soviet policies on arms control and US-Soviet relations: the need to keep the deadlocked INF and START issues from seriously damaging the Soviet political position in Europe—including the effort to fan anti-INF sentiment—and calculations regarding the US election campaign.

The Soviets appear interested in a dialogue with the United States that would end the spiraling deterioration in relations. Nonetheless, they have made it clear they are reluctant to do anything that would enhance the reelection prospects of the present administration by enabling it to claim a major success in the area of US-Soviet relations. At the same time, they apparently believe that, if they appear unyielding, the administration will be able to lay the blame for poor relations on their doorstep and claim that its own attempts at a bilateral improvement have been rebuffed. Moreover, they appear not to have excluded the possibility of some kind of agreement at this time if convinced it would serve their interests.

The Soviets appear deeply pessimistic about the prospects for a significant US concession on START and INF and probably are sensitive to the possibility that, by suspending arms control talks and taking military countermeasures, they have made West Europeans less receptive to arguments that the breakdown in the East-West dialogue is due exclusively to US intransigence and belligerence. They nevertheless may continue to hope that domestic pressures in the US, including electoral politics, and increased concern and pressure from Western Europe over the US-Soviet stalemate could prompt the US to alter its current stance to a position more acceptable to Moscow.

The Soviets already are trying to heighten these pressures through direct appeals to West European leaders, with whom Moscow has maintained close contact despite earlier warnings about the consequences of the first deployments. In private Soviet demarches at this level, as well as in public commentary, they have sought to demonstrate popular opposition to INF, claimed that the US has spurned Soviet efforts to restore the East-West dialogue, and warned that deployment of US missiles subverts the sovereignty of West European countries as well as their "gains" from detente. Moscow might further try to court West European opinion by hinting at willingness to consider multilateral negotiations that would draw the British and French into direct discussion of INF and their own forces' role. It appears more likely at present, however, that the Soviets will try to gain credit by expanding upon their initiatives on non-INF issues in existing multilateral forums such as MBFR, the Disarmament Conference in Geneva, or the CDE.

The Soviets also will continue trying to cast the US in the villain's role by encouraging opposition leaders in the INF-basing countries—particularly the Social Democrats in West Germany—to speak out forcefully against INF deployments. Further, Moscow has

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maintained and perhaps even raised the level of its direct and covert support to the West European peace movement. The Soviets may hope that the existence of deployed missiles—along with announced basing sites—will provide a focus for renewed demonstrations by the dispirited and divided movement. Moscow's efforts in this area probably will be tempered, however, by its wish to avoid the charge of manipulating the peace movement. In addition, it now must face the possibility that elements of the movement could direct their opposition activities against Warsaw Pact countermeasures. Moreover, the Soviet exit from the negotiations makes it difficult for Moscow to recapture the high ground in the contest for public opinion.

Intransigence on Resuming START and INF Talks

Following Chernenko's accession, a brief hiatus in the repetition of Moscow's demand that the INF missiles be withdrawn suggested that the Soviets might be hinting at greater flexibility on resuming talks. There now have been several recent indications that Moscow has decided to maintain its firm line against resuming the Geneva negotiations. In a number of public statements, Soviet leaders have said they will not return to the Geneva talks unless the new US missiles are removed from Europe. In talks from 10 to 12 March with senior US arms control specialists in Moscow under the auspices of the Dartmouth Conference, as well as in Chernenko's talks on 13 March with visiting leaders of the West German Social Democratic Party, the Soviets also rejected the idea of merging the negotiations. Some implied and others asserted outright that neither negotiation could resume unless NATO's new intermediate-range missiles were withdrawn from Western Europe.

Soviet officials at the Dartmouth Conference also dismissed as a solution to INF the "walk-in-the-woods" formula. By rejecting both this formula and a merger, these officials seemed to be closing the door on two potential avenues that some Soviets had speculated as recently as January could lead to a revival of the talks.

The Soviets almost certainly realize, however, that they eventually must moderate their position if they are to limit NATO INF deployments and US strategic systems through resumed INF and START negotiations. Some Soviets have hinted that INF talks could resume this year if the US agreed to a moratorium in the INF deployment schedule and to taking the UK and French systems into account somewhere in the arms control negotiations. The most recent statement to this effect was made in mid-March by a representative of the Institute for the USA and Canada at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, who said that INF talks could be resumed in 1984 if the US met these two conditions. A first secretary and presumed KGB officer at the Soviet Embassy also has suggested that the USSR would be more interested in resuming the INF talks if the US met these two conditions. He also raised the possibility of an INF negotiation involving the US, USSR, France, and the UK.

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Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, in discussions with correspondents, has taken a more upbeat stance on the prospects for strategic arms negotiations than the general line would indicate. His statements clearly have been intended to portray the USSR, despite its tough public stance, as sincerely interested in movement, and thereby to put pressure on the administration for greater flexibility. His remarks also probably reflect instructions to keep open a channel through which Moscow's hoped-for movement from the US side might be conveyed.

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Prospects for Progress on Other Issues

Chernenko seemed to imply in his speech of 2 March that an agreement on issues usually regarded as secondary—particularly the banning of chemical weapons and the demilitarization of space—could prepare the way for a "dramatic breakthrough" in US-Soviet relations despite the impasse in START and INF. The suggestion that it might be possible to bypass the most intractable issues and achieve progress elsewhere appears intended to improve the USSR's image as a proponent of arms control and reduced international tensions despite its continued refusal to return to Geneva. At the same time, the Soviets are probing for flexibility on a range of issues where progress would not necessarily require a reversal of fundamental US or Soviet positions.

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The proposals Chernenko listed represent longstanding Soviet goals and public positions:

- US ratification of the treaties limiting underground nuclear weapons tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.
- Resumption of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty, suspended by the US.
- An agreement to limit weapons in outer space.
- US acceptance of a freeze on nuclear weapons.
- An agreement to ban chemical weapons, an area where he said conditions for an accord are "beginning to ripen."

He hinted that the Soviets, who recently accepted the principle of continuous international monitoring of chemical weapons destruction sites, may be willing to make further moves on chemical weapons verification. He said that they favor an agreement under which there would be effective control of the "whole process of destruction—from beginning to end." [redacted] the Soviets are preparing to table a draft treaty to ban chemical weapons. [redacted]

Soviet officials, particularly the Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, Vladimir Shustov, have indicated that the USSR attaches high priority to initiating "unofficial" talks with the US on limiting the deployment of weapons in outer space. A Central Committee staff member, Stanislav Menshikov, arrived in the US recently with the primary purpose, [redacted] of helping organize such a conference. [redacted]

Chernenko's claim that a US-Soviet agreement on these issues could signal the start of a sharp improvement in bilateral relations suggests the Soviets might consider such an agreement as partial grounds for a meeting at the highest level. Soviet leaders have made a point of insisting, however, that it is up to the US to act first. Moreover, Moscow may well hold out for a firm US commitment to at least negotiate on fundamental Soviet concerns in START and INF before agreeing to any dramatic bilateral gesture. The Soviets will be looking in particular for signals that the US is willing to consider major steps in accordance with Soviet objectives, such as:

- A freeze on further INF deployments, particularly Pershing IIs.
- An agreement to take into account UK and French systems.
- An agreement to limit future deployment of US strategic systems the Soviets consider most threatening—sea- and air-launched cruise missiles, the MX, or the D-5 SLBM.

The Soviets have been ambiguous on the extent to which they hold progress in START dependent upon US concessions in INF. For now, it appears that they would refuse to resume the strategic negotiations unless satisfied that their central INF concerns would be addressed, but this line is doubtless intended in part to probe US willingness to make such concessions, and a definitive Soviet position is likely to emerge only in response to specific US initiatives. [redacted]

Chernenko also suggested that progress could be made toward agreement on "norms" to govern relations between nuclear powers, particularly an agreement to hold urgent consultations in the event of a situation threatening nuclear war. This area would appear to include current US-Soviet negotiations to upgrade crisis communications and talks aimed at preventing a recurrence of the KAL shootdown. Chernenko, however, raised this possibility separately from those issues which he suggested could lead to a "breakthrough" in relations, perhaps to signal that agreement on this point would not be of comparable significance. [redacted]

Chernenko made no reference on 2 March to the MBFR talks, and the Soviets appear to hold little expectation of an early breakthrough. A deputy director of the Institute for the USA and Canada said in late February that the Soviets would not have agreed to resume the talks had they been bilateral, a remark that suggests Moscow believes the principal advantage of the talks lies in the possibilities they offer for dividing the US and its allies. This view probably has been strengthened by Western press reports of differences between the United States and West Germany

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over the Allied position. Even if the Western allies were to agree on softening their position regarding prior agreement on data, the Soviets probably would not accept Western proposals on verification to the extent necessary for an early breakthrough in the talks.

Since the beginning of the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Soviet spokesmen have been stressing the importance of an agreement on the nonuse of force as a step toward improving the climate of East-West relations. Chernenko, however, did not refer to this proposal, and, although the Soviets appear to attach greater importance than the US to declaratory measures, it is doubtful that a moderation of US opposition on this point alone would evoke any response from them on more substantive issues.

Soviet spokesmen have also listed a number of other issues where they claim that agreement by the West would lead to a significant lowering of international tensions. These include a pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, a nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, an agreement to reduce military spending, and the establishment of nuclear-free zones, including northern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. The Soviets doubtless realize that these proposals, where they are not purely cosmetic, would require major strategic concessions by the West, and the proposals therefore appear largely rhetorical, rather than serious attempts to find common ground. By dint of repetition, however, they may have acquired some real significance in Soviet eyes, and it is possible that US willingness to consider the more innocuous among them could be part of a package to improve bilateral relations.

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Uncertainties and Soviet Political Dynamics

Evidence of current power relationships and individual views on arms control within the Politburo is admittedly sparse. We believe, however, that the strategy toward relations with the US suggested in Chernenko's speech reflects a Politburo decision that was made before Andropov's death.

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We do not know the full range of differences within the Politburo on US-Soviet relations. The extent to which Chernenko and his colleagues will stand fast in their demand for significant changes in US positions, especially before the US elections, is unclear. They appear to be concerned, however, that any show of compromise in Moscow prior to some US move would be interpreted as a Soviet retreat in the face of a stiffening American defense posture.

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The evidence at least suggests, therefore, that the Soviet leadership in the coming months is unlikely to approve any measures that imply a major breakthrough in relations unless they are convinced that some US concessions will be forthcoming on significant arms control issues.

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Other Topics

Soviet Nuclear Targeting of Pershing IIs and Cruise Missiles

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The Soviets have a variety of strategic and tactical nuclear missiles and aircraft available for nuclear strikes against Pershing II ballistic missiles and Tomahawk ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. We believe they probably would use missiles first to barrage Pershing and GLCM operating areas and then aircraft for followup strikes. The degree of success the Soviets might expect in such attacks is uncertain. It would depend on various factors, the most critical of which is how well their target reconnaissance system can locate Pershing and GLCM operating areas.

Background

Soviet public statements about the deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs in Europe probably reflect not only concern about the ability of these NATO systems to hit targets within the Soviet Union but also uncertainty about the USSR's ability to target and destroy the systems before or during nuclear operations. Classified Warsaw Pact military writings indicate that over 80 percent of NATO tactical units are expected to change locations at least once prior to the initiation of nuclear operations. This force mobility increases the risk that some targets, especially highly mobile NATO missile units, will elude the initial Soviet nuclear strike and continue to pose a threat to Soviet forces and installations.

Pershing and GLCM units would have high priority as targets during either conventional or nuclear Soviet operations in Europe. Attacks on them during conventional operations, however, are outside the scope of this article. The analysis here assumes that nuclear operations commence early in a war, when most fighting is still along the border between the two Germanys. The nature of Soviet targeting of Pershings and GLCMs under other circumstances—after a protracted conventional war, after a major nuclear exchange, or in a protracted nuclear war—could differ from that described in this article.

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Political rhetoric aside, Soviet military pragmatists are probably focusing on the problems of finding the Pershing IIs and GLCMs and striking them successfully.[1] The Soviets clearly would like to be able to destroy the systems at their home bases, before dispersal to operating areas, although they have to assume that NATO missile units would attempt to disperse before combat began. They recognize that after dispersal the difficulty of locating and attacking the missiles would increase substantially. This is true of any mobile target, but it takes on a greater urgency for military planners in the case of Pershing IIs and GLCMs because important installations in the USSR are within their range.

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NATO Mobile Missiles as Soviet Targets

Soviet press accounts of the Pershing II and GLCM threat to the USSR mention that Soviet planners might be forced to target "zones of dispersal" for

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[1] In this article we do not discuss the capabilities of Soviet air and ABM defenses to counter Pershing IIs and GLCMs that have already been launched. the most effective means of countering these systems is to destroy them before their missiles are launched.

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these systems. This language seems to suggest that they now practice point targeting and that the adoption of area targeting would force them to deploy more nuclear weapons for use in Europe. Our understanding of Soviet nuclear planning methods, however, is that area targeting is not new—it has always been the only practical way for the Soviets to strike mobile missiles.

The Soviets expect that finding these missile units will be difficult even though the total number will be small—only 41 deployed units (see map).[2] Though few, these units will have available 572 missiles—not counting reloads—capable of striking the USSR.

if the Soviets were able to find every Pershing and GLCM unit (unlikely, by their own estimate), they might have to use as many as 80 high-yield nuclear weapons, perhaps totaling 30 megatons, to destroy this force.

The Soviets' nuclear planning is conservative. Their goals for damage against NATO missile units are high and would normally require the expenditure of multiple warheads over large areas to compensate for uncertainties about target location.

[2] These include 29 GLCM flights of four launchers (16 missiles) each, deployed throughout Europe, and 12 Pershing batteries (nine launchers each), deployed in West Germany. These numbers assume that no Pershing II or GLCM units would have been destroyed during conventional operations.



Soviet Reconnaissance Requirements and Assets

Existing Soviet reconnaissance systems for use in Europe are unlikely to find all NATO missile units operating in wooded areas far behind front lines. Because such units have few visual or electronic signatures that would expose them to detection, they probably would be most detectable when moving between launchsites. On average, however, their periods of movement are planned to comprise less than 8 percent of the time they are in the field. Some Pershing IIs and GLCMs probably would be found, but Soviet planners measure reconnaissance effectiveness in terms of their ability to track all targets. A single undetected Pershing battery would have nine missiles available for potential NATO strikes against the USSR.

The Soviets currently have several kinds of suitable reconnaissance assets, of which *Armed Special Purpose (SPETSNAZ) Forces* are probably the most versatile. They could be used in either a commando role to damage or destroy mobile missile units with small-arms fire or a reconnaissance role to report target location for subsequent nuclear or conventional strikes. SPETSNAZ teams are limited in number, however, and have a variety of competing missions, including reconnaissance of airfields and nuclear storage sites. The difficulty of inserting these teams 200

Potential NATO INF Bases

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km or more into NATO territory may not warrant risking many of them in what could be a futile effort.

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Agents already in place in peacetime would probably attempt to track Pershing and GLCM units as they dispersed from their garrisons, and others would be sent behind NATO lines once war had begun. If they could follow such convoys without being detected, the agents would still have the difficult task of reporting target location data promptly and accurately.

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Soviets would rely heavily on both strategic and tactical *aircraft* to locate targets for nuclear strikes and to attack identified missile units prior to such strikes.

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the effectiveness of reconnaissance aircraft would depend on the extent to which the Soviets had achieved air superiority over NATO's rear areas. Without it, attrition rates would be high among Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, which would have to operate 150 km or more behind front lines and behind NATO's air defense belt.

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Among Soviet *satellite* systems, only photoreconnaissance satellites have any capability to detect Pershing and GLCM units. The usefulness of their information on mobile targets would be limited, however, because they lack real-time imaging capabilities, and deorbiting and processing procedures can take several days.

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

For Strategic Missiles. The combination of range, yield, and number of Soviet MR/IRBMs—SS-4s and SS-20s—makes them capable of delivering the most efficient strikes against Pershing II and GLCM units. Soviet weapon planning factors indicate that, if only SS-4s were used, 65 missiles (each with a single warhead) would be needed to destroy the launchers in Pershing II and GLCM deployment areas. About 34 SS-20 missiles (102 warheads) could achieve the same end.

We have no exercise evidence of SS-4s being targeted against Pershing or GLCM units, but a Soviet targeter might choose the SS-4 for striking NATO mobile missile units—mainly because its high yield and poor accuracy limit its utility against most other military targets in Europe.



A potential constraint on the effectiveness of these strategic missiles, however, could be the time required to retarget them if the target moves. We have no direct evidence on the time required to program and load Soviet missile guidance systems with target data not previously stored. If it takes several hours, this delay—combined with long target intelligence processing times—could seriously decrease the effectiveness of SS-4 or SS-20 strikes against NATO's Pershing and GLCM units.

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For Aircraft. We believe the Soviets would consider aircraft strikes a useful alternative or supplement to missile strikes against mobile targets. The Fencer light bombers and the Badger, Blinder, and Backfire medium bombers of strategic aviation probably would be the primary aircraft for such use in Central Europe, and the bombers could reach the GLCM sites in Sicily and the United Kingdom.

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

Outlook

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The Soviets' recognition of the difficulty of targeting NATO mobile missiles will probably compel them to address this problem with greater urgency now that Pershing IIs and GLCMs have begun to arrive in Europe. We expect to acquire new evidence from writings and exercises to suggest how the Soviets will attempt to solve this targeting problem. We believe they would benefit most from improving their technical reconnaissance capabilities and data processing.

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Soviet Weapon Systems That Could Be Used Against Pershing IIs and GLCMs

Strike System	Advantages	Limitations
Tactical missiles (Scud-B, SS-23, SS-12/22	Short flight times would limit warning to NATO targets. Accuracy and yields are well suited for targeting most Pershing and GLCM operating areas.	Limited ranges restrict targeting of distant NATO units. Coordinating tactical strikes with strategic strikes could pose problems. Effectiveness depends on good reconnaissance and easily reprogrammable guidance systems.
Strategic missiles (SS-20, SS-4)	Flight times to targets are short. Systems can reach all Pershing and GLCM launchsites.	Both are capable of area targeting; the SS-4 is better suited because of its higher yield. Both require precise targeting data. Quick retargeting in response to target movement may be beyond current Soviet capabilities.
Tactical and strategic aircraft (Flogger, Fitter, Fencer, Badger, Blinder, Backfire)	Light bombers and fighter-bombers could reach most Pershing and GLCM units on the European continent. Medium bombers could reach all Pershing and GLCM launch areas.	Effective air reconnaissance could depend on Soviet air superiority. Light bombers and fighter-bombers on armed reconnaissance missions have limited loiter time between front missile strikes to search for targets. Medium bombers would have to operate without escorts against deep targets in Sicily or the United Kingdom.
Armed Special Purpose Forces (SPETSNAZ)	A small investment of manpower (rather than equipment) could meet damage goals against NATO mobile missiles. Can provide target location data for other strikes or can engage target with small arms to pin it down or destroy it.	Operational difficulties of putting men deep behind enemy lines could limit SPETSNAZ use. Competing missions could restrict the number of SPETSNAZ teams for this use.

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Soviet-Finnish Trade and Moscow's Foreign Trade Policy

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Moscow has turned increasingly to trade with Finland as a means of acquiring Western-quality machinery and equipment without becoming dependent on imports from the United States and its allies. Further growth of this trade will, however, be constrained by Finland's modest capability to produce high-technology goods and by the limited appeal of Soviet exports other than fuels and raw materials.

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The Special Trade Relationship

Finland's special political relationship with the Soviet Union has given birth to a special economic relationship as well. Fenno-Soviet trade is essentially a barter arrangement whereby Moscow can pay for imports in rubles on the understanding that, at the end of each five-year interval, its purchases and sales are to be equal in value.[1] Even when allowance is made for the impact of oil price increases, the economic relationship has enjoyed impressive growth. Two-way trade grew almost sixfold from 1973 to 1982, according to Soviet data. Moscow's trade with Finland now ranks a strong second to Soviet–West German commerce and exceeds Soviet trade with Japan, France, Italy, and the United States (see graph). While Soviet exports to Finland consist mostly of raw materials, especially petroleum, Finnish sales to the USSR are more diversified and include a great variety of machinery and equipment (see table).

Leading Commodities in Soviet-Finnish Trade, 1982

	Value *(million US $)*	Percent of Total
Soviet exports		
Crude petroleum and oil products	2,479	75
Coal	132	4
Natural gas	107	3
Wood and paper products	99	3
Total for all exports	**3,306**	**100**
Soviet imports		
Wood and paper products	696	18
Ships	581	15
Power, energy-related, and handling equipment	271	7
Clothing and fabrics	205	5
Equipment for processing timber and paper	168	4
Food products	150	4
Footwear	142	4
Total for all imports	**3,861**	**100**

Source: Soviet trade data.

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Benefits to Moscow. The USSR's primary benefit is assured access to Finnish machinery and equipment that meet Western standards. In 1981 Finland ranked second only to Japan among Western suppliers in the value of manufactured goods sold to the Soviet Union. Finnish manufactured exports to the Soviet Union rose ninefold from 1972 to 1981, compared to an increase of only 3.5 times for the rest of OECD. Although high-technology goods represented only 4 percent of the country's total 1981 sales to the USSR—compared to 15 percent for West Germany, 12 percent for Italy, and 11 percent for Japan and France [2]—the USSR puts a high premium on the equipment which Helsinki does provide, especially

[1] The commodity composition and value of the trade are established, in increasing degrees of specificity, by 15-year cooperation agreements, five-year trade accords, and annual commercial protocols. In recent five-year periods, the "requirement" that bilateral trade be balanced has been honored more in the breach than in the observance.

[2] The definition used for this comparison was devised by Kravalis, Lenz, Raffel, and Young in their article "Quantification of Western Exports of High Technology to Communist Countries," p. 37, in *Issues in East-West Commercial Relations: A Compendium of Papers,* Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, 1979. This definition, which consists of 25 commodity categories, is narrower than the COCOM list for proscribed strategic technology exports to the Soviet Bloc because it excludes embodied technology.

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USSR-OECD: Trade Turnover
Triennial Averages, 1971-82



[a] Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.

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lumber processing machinery, merchant ships, offshore drilling vessels and platforms, and capital goods needed to expand extraction of nonferrous metals, particularly copper.

The Soviets also reap an important benefit by purchasing Finnish products that incorporate technology from other Western countries. For example, Finnish shipyards often outfit the drilling rigs they sell to the USSR with Western drilling tools and electronic gear.

Moscow commits large resources to construction projects built by Finnish contractors on Soviet territory. The Soviets have awarded contracts for a broad range of facilities, including a goods terminal at one of Moscow's airports, a railroad car depot near Leningrad, and expansion of grain-handling facilities at the Tallinn harbor. Most of Helsinki's "project exports" are concentrated in the field of raw materials processing.

Trade with the Finns is also attractive to the USSR because its imports do not have to be paid for in hard currency. Soviets negotiating with Helsinki in 1982 for oil drilling rigs preferred dealing with their Nordic neighbor because the bilateral barter arrangement eliminated the need for significant hard currency financing. The advantage to Moscow of trading under a soft currency barter regime is lessened in periods such as the present, however, when the Soviet hard currency payments position is relatively strong. In addition, while the USSR does not pay for Finnish goods directly with convertible currency, it does provide Helsinki with oil and other "hard goods" that could earn hard currency if they were sold on other Western markets.

The Soviets apparently also prefer trading with the Finns for political reasons. Given Finland's special political relationship with the USSR, Soviet planners probably believe that Helsinki is less likely to go along with Western sanctions against the USSR than NATO governments. Moreover, although Helsinki has not been shown to be a transit point for shipments of controlled technology to the USSR, Moscow presumably values its neighbor's refusal to adhere formally to COCOM.

Benefits to Helsinki. The main benefit the Finns obtain from trading with the USSR is an assured market for their goods. This market grows especially important during recessions, when Western demand declines. Moscow has bought an increasingly large share of Finland's world sales over the last decade—12 percent in 1972, 21 percent in 1975, and 25 percent in 1981.

Helsinki's dependence on the Soviet market, however, is potentially risky. Any cutback in sales to bring trade back into balance probably would cause unemployment in the affected sectors. Soviet media have cited estimates by "Finnish economists" that Soviet orders account for 150,000 Finnish jobs.

Recent Trade Strains and Soviet Responses. In 1981, when Finland used the Soviet market to buoy its economy during the Western recession, a large Finnish trade surplus started to accumulate. This surplus amounted to an interest-free loan and as such was resented by the Finns. As the value of oil—the Soviets' largest export—fell, the USSR's new trade deficit grew even more. By 1982 the two countries had agreed to increase the maximum allowable imbalance in the clearing account (the account through which the barter is handled) to 300 million rubles. When the Finnish surplus exceeded even that limit, they decided to transfer 300 million rubles from that account into a special interest-bearing account owned by Finland. Throughout much of 1983, the USSR's total trade deficit with Finland was around 600 million rubles ($825 million); a little more than half this amount was in the interest-bearing account.

Throughout 1982 and 1983, the Soviets attempted to solve the problem on their own terms, pressing the Finns to purchase more Soviet arms and natural gas and to buy a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power plant.

Moscow would slash imports from Finland if Helsinki did not accept the Soviet offers on gas and the power plant. The Finns resisted the Soviet pressure, and Moscow failed to make good on its ultimatum. Helsinki's reluctance to increase its gas purchases centered around the high price offered and the

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cost of building the required pipeline extension. Concern that energy supplies would exceed demand was an important factor for both the gas and the power plant, and political pressure from Finnish environmentalists added to official coolness toward the power plant.

The Finns, for their part, held out for stepped-up Soviet deliveries of other raw materials to solve the trade imbalance. In the autumn of 1982, they gave Moscow a shopping list of goods they wanted included in the 1986-90 trade agreement, including methanol, copper, lead, silver, coal, coke, and wood pulp. In response, the USSR promised in June 1983 to increase its shipments of wood and chemical products beyond the levels prescribed in the present trade agreement.

An even bigger factor in correcting the trade imbalance was the Soviet decision to maintain large petroleum sales. In 1982 the USSR sold the Finns 1 million tons of Libyan crude oil, which they resold for cash on the West European market. (In addition, the Soviets have been delivering around 10 million tons of domestically produced petroleum to Finland annually.) Last year the Finns had contracts to deliver 1.3 million tons of crude oil, probably of Libyan origin, to the international market, and for 1984 Moscow has again acceded to its neighbor's request for more Libyan crude. The current deliveries, which will probably allow the Finns to continue hard currency resales, are intended to produce a modest Soviet trade surplus that will improve the overall 1981-85 trade balance.

This year's trade agreement also gives Finland an option to increase its nonoil imports beyond the protocol level by accepting less oil, but this probably represents wishful thinking on Moscow's part. Helsinki will have little incentive to accommodate the Kremlin's drive to sell more manufactured goods if it is permitted to meet its import obligation primarily through oil purchases. In early February, however, Helsinki and Moscow did come to terms on gas sales, with Finland agreeing to quadruple its purchases by the year 2000. A Soviet decision to soften its position on price apparently clinched the deal.

Prospects

Moscow's willingness to make concessions to the Finns on the trade imbalance issue reflects the importance of its commercial relationship with Finland. The Soviets' main gain from the trade—access to Western-quality manufactured goods—has become even more important now that they are giving preference to non-US suppliers in order to reduce vulnerability to sanctions.

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While Moscow has been willing to pay the price necessary to maintain the level of trade, we believe that this trade will not experience the same growth that occurred in the past decade. The Finnish economy's modest production of advanced technology will significantly affect commerce if Moscow decides to limit its hard currency outlays by giving priority to high-technology imports. On the Soviet side, sales are likely to be constrained by potential shortfalls in the quantity of oil available for export and a continuing inability to produce goods other than fuels and raw materials that can readily be marketed in Finland.

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With energy comprising more than 80 percent of the USSR's exports to Finland, uncertainties in international oil and gas markets cloud the medium-term outlook for maintaining growth in the bilateral trade. Possible fluctuations in future energy prices will make it difficult for Moscow and Helsinki to fine-tune their trade balance and eventually may temper the satisfaction Soviet planners recently took in Helsinki's decision to sharply increase its gas purchases. Moreover, Moscow may well be disappointed in its hopes to sell a nuclear power plant to Finland.

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Over the longer term, there may be more basis for optimism. Both sides probably will be willing to continue making some of the sacrifices needed to prevent a downturn in trade because each perceives large gains in maintaining strong economic and political ties. Moreover, a Soviet decision to move forward with developing the Barents Sea oil deposits will provide considerable impetus to bilateral trade. Finland would probably win some contracts under this project, which is estimated to cost more than $10 billion.

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The same problems that will make it difficult to sustain the size of future Fenno-Soviet trade also are likely to affect the USSR's commerce with other Western industrialized countries. Soviet trade planners will continue having trouble coming up with those products that can be easily marketed to the West, other than raw materials and fuels. Reduced demand for energy exports, illustrated by recent sluggishness in Finland's demand for Soviet gas and the protracted talks over the price of Helsinki's future purchases, will also affect trade prospects with the West generally. The continuing oil glut has put downward pressure on prices and demand, not only for petroleum but also for competing energy sources. On the other hand, the poor energy sales outlook is probably susceptible to improvement in the long run, assuming a strong Western economic rebound.

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Briefs

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

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Deactivation of SS-5 Force

the Soviets have retired the last of 25X1
SS-5 IRBMs—at Taybola and Nigrande in the western USSR. Snow has not been cleared from key launch areas, some buildings have been razed, most launch 25X1
equipment has been removed, and the level of activity has been generally low for some months.

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The SS-5, a single-warhead liquid-propellant missile with a range of 4,100 kilometers, was first fielded in 1961. At peak deployment in 1965, missiles from 101 launchers could hit most theater targets in Western Europe and Asia. The Soviets deactivated some SS-5s in the late 1960s and early 1970s but pushed the work more rapidly after 1977, when SS-20s were introduced.

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In October 1983, then General Secretary Andropov asserted that all the SS-5 sites had been deactivated, but evidence of this at Taybola and Nigrande has been ambiguous until now. Some personnel are still at some launchsites there, and some abandoned equipment is still in place, but the sites are not likely to be reactivated. Deactivation of the SS-5 system leaves the USSR with 378 launchers for the three-warhead SS-20 and 220 SS-4 medium-range single-warhead ballistic missiles. As the Soviets build more SS-20 bases, they probably will resume deactivation of the SS-4 force, phasing the system out by 1987 or 1988.

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Update on the 1982 and 1983 Soviet Grain Crops

On the basis of additional information gleaned in 1983 from scattered and sometimes oblique Soviet press reports of grain production, yields, and state purchases, we have increased our estimate of the 1982 grain crop from 165 million tons to 180 million tons. With respect to the 1983 grain crop, General Secretary Chernenko stated in his early March election speech that production "exceeded 190 million tons." In late March, a middle-level Ministry of Agriculture official told Embassy officers that the 1983 grain crop was 10 million tons "below average." His statement—made in the context of a comparison with the 1976-80 period—implies grain production of 195 million tons in 1983. Although we have little additional evidence to support an estimate below 200 million tons, a 1983 crop of about 195 million tons would be within the range of error (±8 percent) associated with our methodology.[1] The USSR has not published overall grain production, yield, or state purchase statistics since 1980.

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A larger grain crop in 1982 helps explain why the USSR imported less grain during the 1982 crop year (July 1982–June 1983) than we had expected, yet was able to accelerate growth in the crucial livestock sector in 1983.[2] A grain crop as low as 195 million tons in 1983 would provide one rationale for the USSR's having maintained grain imports through the 1983 crop year at levels close to those of the previous crop year and some 40 percent above minimum levels committed under long-term agreements. [redacted] 25X1

Soviet Plans for Export of Oil and Gas to Eastern Europe [redacted]

The USSR plans to increase exports of natural gas to offset eventual reductions of oil deliveries to Eastern Europe but will not cut oil deliveries substantially this year. The US Embassy in Moscow concludes that, although the Soviets cut oil supplies to CEMA nations in 1982, they did not do so in 1983 and probably will not this year. The USSR would like to increase exports of natural gas not only to substitute for scarcer oil, but also to use more of the delivery capacity in existing pipelines. Poland reportedly has agreed to increase its annual purchases of Soviet gas from 6 to 10 billion cubic meters, and Soviet trade officials in Bucharest have said that gas exports to Romania will increase beginning in 1986. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

Status of Jewish Emigration From the USSR [redacted]

Only 1,300 Soviet Jews received permission to emigrate in 1983. This is half the total for 1982 and the lowest number in over a decade. The Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, a "private" group established in April 1983, has announced that emigration came to a "natural end" with the completion of family reunification—the only legal justification for emigration. [redacted] 25X1 25X1

The Anti-Zionist Committee's announcement provides semiofficial confirmation that large-scale emigration has ended. The harshly anti-Semitic content of its propaganda is a transparent effort to discourage Jews from applying for permission to emigrate. At a January press conference, the committee compared Zionists to Nazis and stressed the threat of subversion by foreign Zionist agents. The new leadership might reverse this policy in a bid to improve relations with the United States, but there are less disruptive ways to achieve such an objective. The Soviets, for example, could allow several dissidents of stature to leave the country. [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

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East-West Positions On Arms Control Talks, as of 1 March 1984

	INF	START	MBFR	CTB	CDE
US	Has proposed zero option. Has also proposed as interim offer equal global limits on US and Soviet INF warheads. Has offered to explore limits on aircraft.	Has proposed limits on numbers of missiles, throw weight, and heavy bombers (including Backfire). Has proposed "build-down" whereby a variable number of existing warheads would be withdrawn for each new one deployed, with at least 5 percent of deployed RVs to be reduced each year till floor of 5,000 is reached. Also willing to discuss limits on ALCMs.	Under review. Has wanted agreed manpower data before reductions; believes East has understated ground forces by 150,000+. Has proposed first-stage reduction of 30,000 Soviet for 13,000 US troops. Wants permanent verification, including on-site inspection.	Reagan administration believes a comprehensive test ban (CTB) could impede needed modernization of US systems, withdrew from US-UK-USSR talks on ground that reliable verification not currently feasible.	Supports Western proposals to expand Helsinki confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) dealing with prior notification of military activities and exchange of information about them, and to make these measures verifiable and mandatory; opposes discussion of Soviet declaratory measures or tabling of additional Western measures at this time.
USSR	Has suspended talks until West "shows readiness" to return to predeployment status. Has offered to reduce SS-20s to about 140 (privately, 120) and freeze deployments in Far East if NATO cancels deployment of P-II and GLCMs.	Has suspended talks pending review of position in light of NATO INF deployments. Had offered to reduce missile launchers and bombers, excluding Backfire, to 1,800 by 1990, but linked this to no NATO INF deployments. Has proposed limiting ALCMs, banning GLCMs and SLCMs.	Opposes prior data agreement and rejects Western claim on East's data. Proposes 20,000 Soviet for 13,000 US troops in initial reductions by example. Wants temporary verification measures, including limited on-site inspection, to monitor initial withdrawals.	Has called for resumption of talks. Is seeking to exploit US-UK reluctance to resume talks to curry favor with nonaligned countries in UN and Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament.	Has repeated standard proposals, most of which were in January 1983 Political Declaration of Warsaw Pact; likely to table specific CSBMs later and to give more attention to Soviet proposal for regional ban on chemical weapons.
Other Warsaw Pact Countries	Support Soviet negotiating position but regret Soviet suspension of talks. Romania refuses to endorse counterdeployments and has publicly implied that Moscow shares blame for the impasse. GDR and Czechoslovakia concerned by low-level popular opposition to counterdeployments. Hungary and Bulgaria hope to avoid basing new INF missiles.	Support Soviet negotiating position but regret Soviet suspension of talks and hope for flexibility from both superpowers.	Support Soviet negotiating position. Bulgaria and Romania—not covered in area of reductions—probably hope troops removed from Central Europe will not be redeployed near their borders.	Support Soviet negotiating position.	Non-Bloc negotiations permit maximum contacts with NATO and neutral/nonaligned states. All except Romania support Soviet negotiating position. Bucharest presses own CSBMs, including both declarative and substantive measures.
FRG	Started P-II deployments in December 1983; first of 96 GLCMs to arrive in 1986. Kohl and Genscher currently support adherence to basing schedule, but may come to favor adjustments after first 36 P-IIs become operational this year.	Wants to see talks resumed, but would worry if START reopened and suspension of INF continued. Probably would support merger if NATO consultative process continued and SS-20s were included. May also support five-power conference after START as way to deal with UK, French, and Chinese systems.	Strongly desires progress; eager to resolve data problem. Has suggested alternative approaches on data and verification issues.	Would favor resumption of talks. Abstained from vote on Soviet CTB call in UN, which US voted against.	Most concerned among Allies with making progress at CDE; is maintaining NATO unity on Western CSBMs but believes the West must eventually adopt a nonuse-of-force (NUF) pledge to gain an agreement on CSBMs; believes the West should devise proposals limiting military activities and on notification of independent air and naval activities; remains interested in notification of non-European forces transiting through Europe.
Netherlands	Will try to make basing decision in June, but domestic support for INF weakest here. May call for fewer than 48 GLCMs; wants to eliminate other Dutch nuclear roles.	Wants to see US-Soviet dialogue restored, but would oppose resuming START and leaving INF suspended. Wants both Washington and Moscow to live up to SALT accords. May support START/INF merger, but only if NATO consultations continue. Would favor including British and French missiles in subsequent five-power talks.	Eager to resolve data problem; would follow FRG lead in more flexible approach.	Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from vote on Soviet CTB resolution in UN, which US voted against.	Shares view of FRG on NUF, constraints, and transits.
Belgium	Scheduled basing of 48 GLCMs tied to contentious budget and ethnic issues. Decision-making style tries to avoid confrontation on this issue, and timetables may slip as result. Some delays in site construction already, but Belgium probably will deploy GLCMs.		Forces reduced after stage I. Issue has less political visibility than in the Netherlands and FRG, but Belgians now want a more direct role, including bilateral talks with US.	Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from vote on Soviet CTB resolution.	More cautious than FRG in moving forward with new Western proposals, but still shares view of FRG on NUF, constraints, and transits.
Italy	To base 112 GLCMs in Sicily; first 16 missiles arrived during December 1983. Next missiles will not become operative until early 1986. New government certain by that time; may face additional debates. Could argue that NATO should deploy fewer missiles.	Would worry about decoupling if START resumed but INF did not. Would favor merger only if NATO consultations continue and would support five-power conference after US/USSR agreement on START/INF missile reductions.	Indirect participant; forces would not be reduced. Main concern is verification and associated measures affecting flank countries, but now willing to take more flexible approach.	Favors resumption of talks. Abstained from vote on Soviet resolution.	Believes eventual NUF pledge probably will be necessary; will support consensus on other issues.
France	Did not participate in NATO's decision but has strongly supported INF deployments. Opposes inclusion of UK and French forces in INF.	Main concern is to exclude British and French forces from START as well as INF. Would only participate in five-power conference after deep reductions in US and Soviet arsenals.	Does not participate. Insists on exclusion of French forces. Favors discussion of conventional forces in CDE/CSE context.	Would not participate in resumed talks. Continues nuclear tests below ground in Pacific. Voted with US against Soviet CTB resolution.	More restrained than FRG in moving forward with Western proposals, but acknowledges need for NUF and Western constraint proposals; prefers that constraints be addressed in second phase of CDE; shares FRG view on transits.
UK	First of 160 GLCMs now being deployed. Supports maintaining basing schedule. Will not want domestic opposition to INF to spill over to strategic force modernization programs and may come to favor reduction in GLCM deployments.	Main concern is that START accord not inhibit US-UK nuclear technology sharing. Opposes consideration of UK forces in START. Would favor merger of START and INF only if UK and French forces excluded and NATO consultations continued. Would participate in five-power conference only after US and Soviet reductions had been achieved in START/INF.	Forces in FRG would be reduced. Strongly supports US on data and verification issues. Opposes reduction by example. Has suggested discussion of conventional reductions in CDE.	Would like to see talks resumed but sympathizes with US stand on need for verification. Voted against Soviet CTB resolution.	Similar view to that of France; wants notification of transits.

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